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We study the problem of synthesizing a policy that maximizes the entropy of a Markov decision process (MDP) subject to a temporal logic constraint. Such a policy minimizes the predictability of the paths it generates, or dually, maximizes the exploration of different paths in an MDP while ensuring the satisfaction of a temporal logic specification. We first show that the maximum entropy of an MDP can be finite, infinite or unbounded. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which the maximum entropy of an MDP is finite, infinite or unbounded. We then present an algorithm which is based on a convex optimization problem to synthesize a policy that maximizes the entropy of an MDP. We also show that maximizing the entropy of an MDP is equivalent to maximizing the entropy of the paths that reach a certain set of states in the MDP. Finally, we extend the algorithm to an MDP subject to a temporal logic specification. In numerical examples, we demonstrate the proposed method on different motion planning scenarios and illustrate the relation between the restrictions imposed on the paths by a specification, the maximum entropy, and the predictability of paths.

We study the problem of designing an optimal sequence of incentives that a principal should offer to an agent so that the agent's optimal behavior under the incentives realizes the principal's objective expressed as a temporal logic formula. We consider an agent with a finite decision horizon and model its decision-making process as a Markov decision process (MDP). Under certain assumptions, we present a polynomialtime algorithm to synthesize an incentive sequence that minimizes the cost to the principal. We show that if the underlying MDP has only deterministic transitions, the principal can hide its objective from the agent and still realize the desired behavior through incentives. On the other hand, an MDP with stochastic transitions may require the principal to share its objective with the agent. Finally, we demonstrate the proposed method in motion planning examples where a principal changes the optimal trajectory of an agent by providing incentives.Y. Savas and U. Topcu are with the Department of Aerospace Engineering, University of Texas at Austin, TX, USA.

In two-player zero-sum stochastic games, where two competing players make decisions under uncertainty, a pair of optimal strategies is traditionally described by Nash equilibrium and computed under the assumption that the players have perfect information about the stochastic transition model of the environment. However, implementing such strategies may make the players vulnerable to unforeseen changes in the environment. In this paper, we introduce entropy-regularized stochastic games where each player aims to maximize the causal entropy of its strategy in addition to its expected payoff. The regularization term balances each player's rationality with its belief about the level of misinformation about the transition model. We consider both entropy-regularized N -stage and entropy-regularized discounted stochastic games, and establish the existence of a value in both games. Moreover, we prove the sufficiency of Markovian and stationary mixed strategies to attain the value, respectively, in N -stage and discounted games. Finally, we present algorithms, which are based on convex optimization problems, to compute the optimal strategies. In a numerical example, we demonstrate the proposed method on a motion planning scenario and illustrate the effect of the regularization term on the expected payoff.