No abstract

In this paper, we introduce Carry-based Differential Power Analysis (CDPA), a novel methodology that allows for attacking schemes that use arithmetical addition. We apply this methodology to attacking HMAC-SHA-2. We provide full mathematical analysis of the method and show that under certain assumptions and with a sufficient amount of traces any key can be revealed. In the experimental part of the paper, we demonstrate successful application of the attack both in software simulation and on an FPGA board using power consumption measurements. With as few as 30K traces measured on the FPGA board, we recover the secrets that allow for forging the HMAC-SHA-2 signature of any message in 3% of the cases — while with 275K traces the success rate reaches 100%. This means that any implementation of HMAC-SHA-2, even in pure parallel hardware, is vulnerable to side-channel attacks, unless it is adequately protected. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first published full-fledged attack on pure hardware implementations of HMAC-SHA-2, which does not require a profiling stage.

No abstract

In this work, we present RAMBAM, a novel concept of designing countermeasures against side-channel attacks and the Statistical Ineffective Fault Attack (specifically SIFA-1) on AES that employs redundant representations of finite field elements. From this concept, we derive a family of protected hardware implementations of AES. A fundamental property of RAMBAM is a security parameter d that along with other attributes of the scheme allows for making trade-offs between gate count, maximal frequency, performance, level of robustness to the first and higher-order side-channel attacks, and protection against SIFA-1. We present an analytical model that explains how the scheme reduces the leakage and how the design choices affect it. Furthermore, we demonstrate experimentally how different design choices achieve the required goals. In particular, the compact version exhibits a gate count as low as 12.075 kGE, while maintaining adequate protection. The performance-oriented version provides latency as low as one round per cycle, thus combining protection against SCA and SIFA-1 with high performance which is one of the original design goals of AES. Finally, we assess the leakage of the scheme for the first and the second (bivariate) orders using TVLA methodology on an FPGA implementation and observe resilience to at least 348M traces with 16 Sboxes.