At present, corporate social responsibility has been widely mentioned by the international society, especially platform enterprises. For a platform that assumes social responsibilities, consumer surplus is a rather critical aspect, and product quality is one of the most important factors directly related to consumers. This paper studies a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailing platform, in which the retailing platform procures products from the manufacturer. The manufacturer produces the products and decides the product quality. We consider two channel structures of the manufacturer and the retailing platform in the reseller mode and marketplace mode. Based on the model analysis and discussions, we obtain some managerial insights that are helpful in commercial practice. For the retailing platform, it has to suffer a loss in economic profit to care more about consumer surplus and become a social responsibility platform. In addition, its social responsibility plays different roles in different channel structures. In the marketplace mode, a social responsibility retailing platform helps to improve product quality. In the reseller mode, the retailing platform’s social responsibility does not make a change in product quality. Furthermore, the product quality in the reseller mode is always higher than that in the marketplace mode. From the perspective of economic profits, the manufacturer obtains higher profits in the reseller mode than the marketplace mode. The retailing platform obtains higher profits in the marketplace mode than the reseller mode.
The contract between the carrier and forwarder is a long-term issue, and the repeated contract business makes the forwarder develop a reference point based on the contract prices, and this reference effect, to a large extent, affects the forwarder’s contract purchasing decisions. Based on that, this paper introduces the reference effect in the sea-cargo supply chain and studies a multiple-period contract problem between the carrier and the forwarder. It is found that when the capacity price in the spot market is less than the forwarder’s willingness-to-pay, the forwarder’s contract purchasing decision is not affected by the reference effect, only by the capacity price in the spot market, and the multiple-period contract problem can be simplified into a single-period game. In addition, the carrier’s optimal contract wholesale price approaches the capacity price in the spot market. Although, the forwarder’s contract purchasing decision depends upon the reference effect, it is difficult to derive the closed-form solution. Moreover, because of the risk in the spot market, the carrier tends to sell his/her capacity in the contract market. Finally, we employ the numerical simulation to study the carrier’s contract pricing decisions and the forwarder’s capacity purchasing decisions in two cases.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.