We study a supply chain with manufacturer encroachment in which product quality is endogenous and customers have heterogeneous preferences for quality. It is known that, when quality is exogenous, encroachment could make the retailer better-off. Yet when quality is endogenous and the manufacturer has enough flexibility in adjusting quality, we find that encroachment always makes the retailer worse-off in a large variety of scenarios. We also establish that, while a higher manufacturer's cost of quality hurts the retailer in absence of encroachment, it could benefit the retailer with encroachment. In addition, we show that a manufacturer offering differentiated products through two channels prefers to sell its high-quality product through the direct channel. Contrary to conventional wisdom, quality differentiation does not always benefit either manufacturer or retailer. Our results may explain why, despite extant theoretical predictions, retailers almost always resent encroachment. These findings also suggest that firms must be cautious when adopting quality differentiation as a strategy to ease channel conflict caused by encroachment.

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In uncertain environments, project reviews provide an opportunity to make “continue or abandon” decisions and thereby maximize a project’s expected payoff. We experimentally investigate continue/abandon decisions in a multistage project under two conditions: when the project is reviewed at every stage and when review opportunities are limited. Our results confirm findings in the literature that project abandonment tends to be delayed; yet, we also observe premature termination. Decisions are highly path dependent; in particular, subjects are more likely to abandon after observing reduced project value, and abandonment rate is higher near the middle—rather than near the beginning or end—of a project. Interestingly, when reviews are limited, subjects are less likely to continue a project that should be abandoned. At the same time, subjects are more inclined to review again after receiving negative (rather than positive) news. Our data are explained well by a model that incorporates three behavioral concepts—gains or losses from comparing the project value with an internal adaptive reference point, sunk cost bias, and status quo bias. Our work suggests that more frequent reviews need not lead to better project performance, and it also identifies contexts in which outside intervention is most valuable in project decision making. This paper was accepted by Gad Allon, operations management.

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When wages are transparent, sales agents may compare their pay with that of their peers and experience positive or negative feelings if those peers are paid (respectively) less or more. We investigate the implications of such social comparisons on sales agents’ effort decisions and their incentives to help or collaborate with each other. We then characterize the firm’s optimal sales force compensation scheme and the conditions under which wage transparency benefits the firm. Our results show that the work environment—which includes such aspects as demand uncertainty, correlation across sales territories, and the possibility of help/collaboration—plays a significant role in the firm’s compensation and wage transparency decisions. In particular, wage transparency is more likely to benefit the firm when demand uncertainty is low, sales outcomes are positively correlated across different sales territories, and sales agents can collaborate at low cost. We find that, contrary to conventional wisdom, social comparisons need not reduce collaboration among agents. Our study also highlights the importance of providing the right mix of individual and group incentives to elicit the benefits of wage transparency. This paper was accepted by Juanjuan Zhang, marketing.

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Problem definition: A fast fashion system allows firms to react quickly to changing consumer demand by replenishing inventory (via quick response) and introducing more fashion styles. In this paper, we study the environmental impact of the fast fashion business model by analyzing its implications for product quality, variety, and inventory decisions. Relevance: Our work establishes a much-needed understanding of the link between the fast fashion business model and its environmental consequences. Methodology: We consider a two-period model in which a firm sells to fashion-sensitive consumers whose preferences are influenced by a random fashion trend. We analyze the effect of fast fashion capabilities (quick response and design flexibility) on the firm’s quality decision, leftover inventory and total environmental impact. Results: We find that a key driver of low product quality in the fast fashion industry is the firm’s incentive to offer variety to hedge against uncertain fashion trends. When variety is endogenous, quality decreases as consumers become more sensitive to fashion or as the cost of introducing new styles decreases. We identify the conditions under which increasing fast fashion capabilities leads to higher environmental impact. Managerial implications: We assess the effectiveness of three environmental initiatives (waste disposal regulations, consumer education, and production tax schemes) in countering the environmental impact of fast fashion. We show that waste disposal policies and production taxes are effective in reducing the firm’s leftover inventory—but may have the unintended consequence of lowering product quality, which may worsen the firm’s environmental impact. We also find that education campaigns that increase consumers’ sensitivity to quality strictly benefit the environment in the long run.

Most service settings involve some degree of variability in the quality of customers’ experiences. An understudied mechanism is analyzed by which this variability can reduce firm revenues when customers do not know true service quality but rather learn about that quality over time based on their experiences. Essentially, customers get stuck with low-quality opinions and low purchase likelihoods after unusually bad experiences. However, high-quality opinions after unusually good experiences are quickly corrected. The authors show that dynamic pricing can help mitigate this effect. Specifically, if the firm can set individual prices so that each customer perceives the same surplus, then the variability impact is entirely eliminated. They also demonstrate that simpler heuristics similar to those observed in practice (requiring less information and pricing flexibility) can partially mitigate the revenue loss.