Motivated by the industrial practices, this work explores the carbon emission reductions for the manufacturer, while taking into account the capital constraint and the cap-and-trade regulation. To alleviate the capital constraint, two contracts are analyzed: greening financing and cost sharing. We use the Stackelberg game to model four cases as follows: (1) in Case A1, the manufacturer has no greening financing and no cost sharing; (2) in Case A2, the manufacturer has greening financing, but no cost sharing; (3) in Case B1, the manufacturer has no greening financing but has cost sharing; and, (4) in Case B2, the manufacturer has greening financing and cost sharing. Then, using the backward induction method, we derive and compare the equilibrium decisions and profits of the participants in the four cases. We find that the interest rate of green finance does not always negatively affect the carbon emission reduction of the manufacturer. Meanwhile, the cost sharing from the retailer does not always positively affect the carbon emission reduction of the manufacturer. When the cost sharing is low, both of the participants’ profits in Case B1 (under no greening finance) are not less than that in Case B2 (under greening finance). When the cost sharing is high, both of the participants’ profits in Case B1 (under no greening finance) are less than that in Case B2 (under greening finance).
In this paper, we firstly investigate issues of low carbon supply chain including one retailer and one manufacturer in the context of joint information asymmetry and cap-and-trade mechanism, where the retailer is a leader and faces a stochastic demand, and the manufacturer is a follower and keeps private information in carbon emissions. Our aim is to design an incentive contract to make the manufacturer disclose the carbon information. Furthermore, we quantify the effects of the carbon price, the carbon emissions and the carbon quota on the supply chain model and design an incentive contract for improving supply chain performance. Finally, we give a couple of numerical examples and undertake sensitivity analysis to illustrate the proposed model and provide some managerial inferences in the conclusions.
Abstract:We study an emission-dependent dyadic fashion supply chain made up of a supplier and a manufacturer, both of which can reduce their own component/product emissions to serve the carbon-footprint sensitive consumers. With Carbon Tax regulation, we consider four scenarios resulting from two ways in form of adopting transfer price contract and/or introducing third-party emission-reduction service (TPERS) to enhance the efficiency of systematic emission reductions. We refine four models from these corresponding scenarios, which in turn constitute a decision-making framework composed of determining vertical incentives and choosing supply chain structures. By exploiting Stackelberg games in all models, we compare their emission reduction efficiencies and profitability for each pair of settings. Theoretic analysis and numerical studies show that adopting vertical transfer payment schemes can definitely benefit channel carbon footprint reduction and Pareto improvement of supply chain profitability, regardless of whether the emissionreduction service exists or not. However, whether introducing TPERS or not is heavily depending on systematic parameters when the transfer payment incentive is adopted there. We also provide insights on the sensitivity of carbon tax parameters with respect to the supply chain performance, overall carbon emission reduction, vertical incentive and TPERS adopting decision-makings.
OPEN ACCESSSustainability 2015, 7 4281
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