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Abstract:We study an emission-dependent dyadic fashion supply chain made up of a supplier and a manufacturer, both of which can reduce their own component/product emissions to serve the carbon-footprint sensitive consumers. With Carbon Tax regulation, we consider four scenarios resulting from two ways in form of adopting transfer price contract and/or introducing third-party emission-reduction service (TPERS) to enhance the efficiency of systematic emission reductions. We refine four models from these corresponding scenarios, which in turn constitute a decision-making framework composed of determining vertical incentives and choosing supply chain structures. By exploiting Stackelberg games in all models, we compare their emission reduction efficiencies and profitability for each pair of settings. Theoretic analysis and numerical studies show that adopting vertical transfer payment schemes can definitely benefit channel carbon footprint reduction and Pareto improvement of supply chain profitability, regardless of whether the emissionreduction service exists or not. However, whether introducing TPERS or not is heavily depending on systematic parameters when the transfer payment incentive is adopted there. We also provide insights on the sensitivity of carbon tax parameters with respect to the supply chain performance, overall carbon emission reduction, vertical incentive and TPERS adopting decision-makings. OPEN ACCESSSustainability 2015, 7 4281

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In the era of the sharing economy, the rise of production capacity sharing has changed traditional manufacturing modes and broken the balance of original production systems. In addition to that environmental-friendly manufacturing enterprises are of great significance with regard to production capacity sharing and sustainable development of the ecology environment. To investigate the decision-making behaviors of the participants involved in low-carbon production capacity sharing, an evolutionary game model taking into account the platforms, manufacturing enterprises with idle production capacity, and those with demanding production capacity is constructed. Then, both evolutionary game theory and Lyapunov stability theorem are used to analyze the asymptotic stability of the equilibrium and evolutionary stability strategies of the system. Besides, the economic and managerial significance of the evolutionary stability strategy is given. Finally, the influence of low-carbon production capacity of enterprises on the stability of the dynamic system is discussed, such as the cost effect of low-carbon production capacity, the effect of transaction cost, and so on. Results indicate that they can provide theoretical reference for decision-making with respect to the platforms, manufacturing enterprises, and sustainable development of the dynamic system.

With the maturity of mobile payments and internet technology, a new type of travel mode, shared bicycles, was brought out by China’s urban transport under the impetus of “the last mile” travel demand. Although convenient travel has been achieved by using shared bicycles, the resulting problems such as disorderly parking and the deposition of bicycles could severely influence urban traffic order and impede the sustainable development of shared bicycles. Based on the quasi-public goods property of shared bicycles, this article established a management system for the tripartite collaborative governance of disorderly bicycle parking by virtue of regulating the bicycle parking behavior of users, the promoting of multiple propaganda and macro-institutional controls of the government, and acquiring technique support of enterprise “entry settlement”. Furthermore, considering the influence on the governance effect of user conduct, a structural model for guiding users to regulate bicycle parking to guarantee the governance effect by adopting material incentive and spiritual motivation was established via the utilization of the theory of planned behavior and motivation theories, and multiple hypotheses were also proposed. In this article, users of shared bikes in Beijing, China were selected as the research objects, and a questionnaire survey was adopted as the empirical research method. In addition, the governance validity on disorderly parking of the collaborative governance model was tested via hierarchical regression analysis after the collection and analysis of the factors influencing bicycle parking behavior of users. The obtained results show that the tripartite collaborative governance model could enhance the regular parking consciousness of users and improve the governance effect of disorderly parking. The research conclusion of this article could provide feasible suggestions for the governance of bicycle disorderly parking and propel the sustainable development of shared bicycles.

Ride‐sharing platforms, such as Uber and Didi Chuxing, widely use differential pricing strategies to encourage platform participation. However, it remains unclear whether differential pricing strategies in ride sharing are reasonable when users care about price fairness. Moreover, platforms face a unique dilemma when considering differential pricing: should it be used for customers, drivers, or both? On the demand side, platforms must deal with taxi competition, while the supply side contends with government regulation; it is this dilemma that motivates our work. Using a stylized model that includes price fairness, market conditions, and government policies, we consider four ride‐sharing platform pricing strategies: uniform pricing, differential customer pricing, differential driver pricing, and bilateral differential pricing. We present results from three perspectives. For platforms, we obtain feasible regions in all four pricing strategies. If the maximal number of potential drivers is below certain thresholds, a platform will use differential driver pricing. Conversely, differential customer pricing is optimal when the maximal number of potential drivers is sufficiently large. Moreover, when customers have stronger fairness concerns, platforms tend to use differential driver pricing to reduce competition. From the government perspective, when a platform charges customers differently, the government can achieve a win‐win solution for sustainable development and market stability by setting a proper taxi rate. Interestingly, we find that, for the demand and supply sides, an increase in fairness concerns may hurt customers and drivers under certain conditions.