The rapid development of digital platform businesses has facilitated the expansion of gig work in China and elsewhere in recent years. Now that IT-powered platforms have been used in part to free the capital from taking employer responsibilities, the capital’s toolkit for labor control has been significantly limited. Drawing on qualitative field research supplemented by quantitative data on Uber in China, this article provides a novel empirical account of the labor control of digital platforms, and more importantly, their effects on different types of workers. The authors have identified three crucial strategies that Uber has devised to control its drivers’ labor process: an incentive pay system, a customer evaluation system, and flexible work arrangements. These strategies will, however, demonstrate significant effects on drivers’ working hours and income only when we consider the different motivations of Uber drivers. Specifically, the working efforts of those who drive for Uber as their only source of income are responsive to incentive pay schemes and a platform’s evaluation system, but are not as responsive to work flexibility. The exact opposite is the case for drivers who have other jobs and sources of income.
This mixed-method study analyzes the labor process and labor supply of drivers on a Chinese mobile-travel platform. Different from the control of the traditional labor process, such platforms have a more-fragmented control of labor, which coexists with workers' task autonomy. Based on this assessment, we propose three core mechanisms by which platforms control the labor process and produce work consent: task autonomy, performance-related pay and motivation, and the star rating system. Under the influence of these three mechanisms, workers form both active consent to and passive acceptance of the platform and its rules. Moreover, we analyze data from a survey of 15,484 drivers to show that drivers' work consent could be transformed into overwork, although identity difference is at play in the transformation process.
Nowadays, the competition of cities essentially is a competition for city brands. In fact, it is necessary for each city to implement a city brand strategy on their developing road.Rizhao , a seaside city in China, has many fine resources such as the coastal deep harbor, the seashore sand beach and the University City ,which, however, still are separated rather than combined together.By developing the nationwide theme, the following article associates resources fully in an attempt to build up the Rizhao city brand.
This article explores the relationship between public sector employment and population health both theoretically and quantitatively. First, we build a theoretical framework to situate public employment in the literature that explores the link between politics and health. We argue that public employment, as an instrument of pro-redistributive policies in both the labor market and the welfare state, improves equality and ultimately health. Second, based on a cross-country dataset from the 1980s, and by applying regression analysis and outlier identification techniques, we find that population health measured by life expectancy improves with the size of public employment. The association is stronger for countries with lower income and for women. When policymakers contemplate downsizing state enterprises and government functions, they should consider the health effect of public employment.
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