Labor control in the gig economy: Evidence from Uber in China

Abstract

The rapid development of digital platform businesses has facilitated the expansion of gig work in China and elsewhere in recent years. Now that IT-powered platforms have been used in part to free the capital from taking employer responsibilities, the capital’s toolkit for labor control has been significantly limited. Drawing on qualitative field research supplemented by quantitative data on Uber in China, this article provides a novel empirical account of the labor control of digital platforms, and more importantly, their effects on different types of workers. The authors have identified three crucial strategies that Uber has devised to control its drivers’ labor process: an incentive pay system, a customer evaluation system, and flexible work arrangements. These strategies will, however, demonstrate significant effects on drivers’ working hours and income only when we consider the different motivations of Uber drivers. Specifically, the working efforts of those who drive for Uber as their only source of income are responsive to incentive pay schemes and a platform’s evaluation system, but are not as responsive to work flexibility. The exact opposite is the case for drivers who have other jobs and sources of income.

The organisation and experience of work in the gig economy

“…The question of algorithmic management is probably among the most debated, in both academia and practice, with more work needed on the topic. The article by Wu et al (2019) in this special issue contributes to a better understanding of what might be the future of management. In particular, they investigate how quality of service can be ensured through these new labour control tools, focusing on the combination of incentive pay schemes and platform evaluation systems.…”

“…investigate the 'sub-entrepreneurial' status of ride-share drivers and study the personal narratives to uncover how those drivers make sense of their ambiguous occupational identity. Wu et al (2019) consider the control strategies employed by ride-share giant Uber during its operation in China (it has since withdrawn from the Chinese market). In particular, the authors identify three key strategies, those being incentive pay structures, customer ratings and flexible work arrangements.…”

Regulating Flexibility: Uber’s Platform as a Technological Work Arrangement

“…However, the Uber Black drivers in Oslo seem to be older than the drivers in the United States (Hall & Krueger 2018: 710). Seventeen of the drivers had Uber as their full-time job and sole source of income, while other studies have found a larger proportion of part-time work (see Peticca-Harris et al 2020; Rosenblat 2018; Wu et al 2019). I met only one driver who worked part-time, while two other, the only drivers without immigrant background, were in a very different situation than their colleagues: While commission-paid, they earn a stable and decent income and either have their own company or work for limousine companies not reliant on Uber.…”

“…While the rating system do make the drivers conscious about their interaction with passengers, it does not take the form of an actualized struggle for survival. The Uber Black drivers in Oslo does not employ strategies of, for example, providing passengers with water bottles and charges to gain favorable ratings, found among American and Chinese drivers (Rosenblat & Stark 2016;Wu et al 2019).…”

“…My methodological aim was not to attain representativeness or capture the full Lebenswelt of the drivers, but rather to collect experiences and information enabling an analysis the drivers' working conditions and work arrangement. Since my sample is relatively small and homogeneous, it is, in addition, not possible to differentiate between the experiences of different types of drivers, as Peticca-Harris et al (2020) and Wu et al (2019) do. My analysis can thus to a limited degree provide the complete picture of the social and economic situations of Uber drivers in Oslo.…”