As a historical contribution to the current cognition-emotion debate in psychology, this article seeks (a) to bring to the readers' attention the largely ignored tradition of cognitive emotion theory within introspective psychology by reviewing what is probably the most clearly formulated cognitive emotion theory of this period, that proposed by Carl Stumpf, and (b) to point out the relevance of Stumpf's contributions to the psychology of emotions for the contemporary cognition-emotion discussion. It is suggested that Stumpf's version of a cognitive-evaluative theory of emotion deserves the serious attention of contemporary investigators and that several of his objections to noncognitive theories of emotion retain their force against modern versions of these theories.

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Selon le modkle A deux niveaux des innovations scientifiques, la technologie prend racine dans la recherche fondamentale. Si ce modtle est pertinent pour certains domaines tels que les sciences de I'ingknieur et la physique, il ne semble pas adaptk 1 la relation existant actuellement entre les psychologies fondamentale et appliquee. La psychologie appliquee suit un developpement autonome et ne benkficie pas substantiellement des apports de la psychologie fondamentale. L'autonomie de la psychologie appliquee serait A rapporter 1 son orientation pragmatique qui se revkle incompatible avec I'orientation ontologique qui prkvaut en psychologie fondamentale. Dans la philosophie occidentale. la tradition pragrnatique est opposee 1 la tradition ontologique. Une Ctude historique rkvkle deux facettes de la psychologie appliquke: d'une part une focalisation sur la psychologie en tant que discipline universitaire. d'autre part une approche transdisciplinaire prenant en compte la cornposante psychologique dans des professions et des disciplines variees, comme la medecine et I'education. La psychologie appliquee incorporee A des disciplines ayant leur domaine propre remonte 1 la culture mediterraneenne prechretienne. Elle fit cependant I'effet d'une nouveautk quand au XX" sikcle elle revendiqua son propre statut dans la psychologie universitaire et parmi les professions A caracthe social. A la fin de ce sikcle, la psychologie appliquee a remarquablement consolide ses statuts academique et professionnel, mais les transferts de la psychologie fondamentale A la psychologie appliquee restent negligeables. On discute, sur ce fond historique, des perspectives d'integration des recherches fondamentale et appliquee en psychologie.According to the two-stage model of scientific innovations, technology is rooted in basic research. Although this two-stage model may adequately account for some fields such as engineering and physics, it doesn't seem to fit the present relationship between applied and basic psychology. Applied psychology has taken an autonomous course of development and has not substantially benefited from basic psychology. The autonomy of applied psychology is explained as due to its pragmatic orientation, which proved to be incompatible with the ontological orientation prevailing in basic Requests for repnnts should be addressed to Prof Dr Wolfgang Schonpflug. lnstitut fur Psychologie, Freie Univenitat Berlin. Habelschwerdter Allee 45,

In 2 articles, this journal has presented critical psychology (CP), which emerged in Germany during the 1980s, as an exemplary paradigm that committed itself to both scientific and political objectives and became a victim of Cold-War confrontations. The presentation was mainly based on narratives and writings circulating within CP itself. I have reexamined the case using archival materials and supplementary literary sources. This allows for a more complete and balanced account of postwar psychology and the contemporary political situation in general. In particular, I argue against Teo's hypothesis that CP was an indigenous paradigm that had to assert itself against American psychology. Marxism, constructivism, and subject orientation are analyzed as principal components of CP, and a claim for sole representation is identified as a predominant reason for the isolation of CP within German psychology. Finally, I briefly report on CP following the collapse of Soviet communism and comment on the present historicization of CP.