A new experimental paradigm involving a computerised quiz was used to examine, on an intra-individual level, the strength of association between four components of the surprise syndrome: cognitive (degree of prospectively estimated unexpectedness), experiential (the feeling of surprise), behavioural (degree of response delay on a parallel task), and expressive (the facial expression of surprise). It is argued that this paradigm, together with associated methods of data analysis, effectively controls for most method factors that could in previous studies have lowered the correlations among the components of emotion syndromes. It was found that (a) the components of the surprise syndrome were all positively correlated; (b) strong association existed only between the cognitive and the experiential component of surprise; (c) the coherence between syndrome components did not increase with increasing intensity of surprise; and (d) there was also only moderate coherence between the components of the facial expression of surprise (eyebrow raising, eye widening, mouth opening), although in this case, coherence tended to increase with intensity. Taken together, the findings support only a weakly probabilistic version of a behavioural syndrome view of surprise. However, the component correlations seem strong enough to support the existence of strong associations among a subset of the mental or central neurophysiological processes engaged in surprise. 1 Considering the popularity of the syndrome view of emotions, it is surprising to learn that its empirical support is far from solid: Experimental 1 Apart from ``syndrome view' ' (e.g. Averill, 1980; Lazarus et al., 1970) the theory of the nature of emotions under discussion also goes by names such as the ``componential' ' , ``multicomponent ' ' , or ``component process' ' view of emotions (e.g. Frijda et al., 1992; Scherer, 1984), the view that emotions are ``organised response patterns' ' , and probably still others. I prefer the term ``syndrome view' ' because it points to, but does not enforce, a probabilistic perspective, and because it is neutral with respect to the nature of the syndrome components (they can be mental, behavioural, or both). studies of the degree of association among the components and subcomponents of presumed emotion syndromes (e.g. fear, happiness, anger, or surprise), particularly studies in which multiple syndrome components were measured, are comparatively rare; they exist only for few emotions; and they provide for the greater part at best limited support for the syndrome view. That is, these studies often found (a) non-significant or very weak, and occasionally even negative associations between syndrome components, as well as (b) context-(and participant-) dependence of these associations (for recent, partial reviews of the literature, see e.g. Meyer, Schützwohl, & Reisenzein, 1997a; Schmidt-Atzert, 1993). Although most of the more recent versions of syndrome theories of emotion are formulated probabilistically and do not even necessarily predi...