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This paper examines optimal trade and privatization policies in a mixed duopoly in which a pubic home firm competes with a more efficient foreign firm. The home firm is a Cournot competitor or a Stackelberg leader. The home government chooses the degree of privatization and import tariff to maximize national welfare. The paper examines the policy effects on industry equilibrium with general demand and cost structures and shows that the optimal level of privatization depends crucially upon the strategic substitutability-complementarity assumption. It further shows that if both policies are used under linear demand and quadratic costs, the equilibrium prices, firms' outputs, welfare and tariff rates are the same under Cournot and Stackelberg competition, and price equals the home firm's marginal cost. Neither full nationalization nor full privatization is optimal under Cournot, but full nationalization is always optimal under Stackelberg competition. If only one policy is used, a reduction in government's ownership of the public firm under Cournot competition and constant marginal costs calls for a higher optimal tariff rate. This result does not carry over to the case of increasing marginal costs, although the optimal tariff is lower under full nationalization than under full privatization.Privatization, tariff, mixed duopoly, cost asymmetry,

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Electron affinities, Ea, E1 and A1 are reported for the 12 primary X, A–K (27 spin) states of O2(−): KeqT3/2 = (SanQan)(2πmek/h2)3/2exp(Ea/RT); k1 = A1T−1/2exp(−E1/RT). These are obtained from pulsed discharge electron capture detector data by rigorously including literature values and uncertainties in a global non-linear least-squares adjustment. Simple molecular orbital theory predicts 27 bonding and 27 anti-bonding low-lying spin states. For the first time, the positive Ea for the 27 bonding states are reported. The partition function ratios of the negative ion and neutral (SanQan), the A1(X–E) and the spin separations are from fundamental constants. The Ea (in eV) are as follows (with the spin states in brackets): [1.050, 1.070]; [0.915, 0.935]; [0.698, 0.718, 0.746, 0.782]; [0.734, 0.754]; [0.559, 0.587]; 0.518; [0.430, 0.450]; 0.380; 0.354; [0.286, 0.298, 0.318, 0.346]; [0.232, 0.252]; [0.172, 0.184, 0.204, 0.232]. The activation energies (in eV) are as follows: E1(X–C) 1.0; E1(D,E) 1.0, 0.8, 0.6; E1(F–K) 0.12–0.08. The Ea and E1 are used to calculate bonding Herschbach ionic Morse–Person empirical curves.

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This paper explores a monopolist's optimal multi‐tier quantity‐discount prices and shows that only the last tier's marginal cost is relevant in determining the tier prices and each tier's price is equal to its preceding tier's marginal revenue. An increase in total output is associated with larger individual tiers’ own and cumulative outputs (the stretching effect), and the increases in their cumulative outputs are smaller if their tiers are closer to the first one (the ripple effect). The pricing structure is further characterized by the tier Lerner indices and the price elasticities defined on individual tiers’ own and their commutative outputs.

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