The authors investigate how labor market institutions such as unemployment insur ance, unions, firing regulations, and minimum wages have affected the evolution of wage inequality among male workers. Results of estimations using data on institutions in eleven OECD countries indicate that changes in labor market institutions can ac count for much of the change in wage inequality between 1973 and 1998. Factors found to have been negatively associated with male wage inequality are union density, the strictness of employment protection law, unemployment benefit duration, unemploy ment benefit generosity, and the size of the minimum wage. Over the 26-year period, institutional changes were associated with a 23% reduction in male wage inequality in France, where minimum wages increased and employment protection became stricter, but with an increase of up to 11% in the United States and United Kingdom, where unions became less powerful and (in the United States) minimum wages fell. Wage inequality is substantially lower in continental European countries than in the United States and United Fiingdom, and its evolution over time has differed greatly across countries. The same holds true for the skill (or education) wage premium. Changes in the supply of and demand for skills are unlikely to fully account for these marked differences (Acemoglu 2003). A substantial amount of research on wage inequality has examined the forces that may shift the rela tive demand for skills, such as changing trade patterns and skill-biased technical change. However, since developed economies operate in the same global environment, with inte grated trade and equal access to technology,
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Employment Protection, Product Market Regulation and Firm SelectionWinfried Koeniger Julien Prat The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit company supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its research networks, research support, and visitors and doctoral programs. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. ABSTRACT Employment Protection, Product Market Regulation and Firm Selection *This paper analyzes the effect of labor and product market regulation in a dynamic stochastic equilibrium with search frictions. Modeling multiple-worker firms allows us to distinguish between the exit-and-entry (extensive) margin, and the hiring-and-firing (intensive) margin. We characterize analytically how both margins depend on regulation before we calibrate the model to the US economy. We find that firing costs matter most for the intensive margin. Fixed or set-up costs in the product market instead alter primarily the behavior of firms at the extensive margin. Moreover, we find important interactions between the policies through firm selection. Finally, the opposite effect of product and labor market regulation on job turnover rationalizes the empirically observed similarity of turnover rates across countries. JEL Classification:E24, J63, J64, J65
We show how the method of endogenous gridpoints can be extended to solve models with occasionally binding constraints among endogenous variables very efficiently. We present the method for a consumer problem with occasionally binding collateral constraints and non-separable utility in durable and non-durable consumption. This problem allows for a joint analysis of durable and non-durable consumption in models with uninsurable income risk which is important to understand patterns of consumption, saving and collateralized debt. We illustrate the algorithm and its efficiency by calibrating the model to US data. JEL classification: C63, E21, D91.
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