The authors investigate how labor market institutions such as unemployment insur ance, unions, firing regulations, and minimum wages have affected the evolution of wage inequality among male workers. Results of estimations using data on institutions in eleven OECD countries indicate that changes in labor market institutions can ac count for much of the change in wage inequality between 1973 and 1998. Factors found to have been negatively associated with male wage inequality are union density, the strictness of employment protection law, unemployment benefit duration, unemploy ment benefit generosity, and the size of the minimum wage. Over the 26-year period, institutional changes were associated with a 23% reduction in male wage inequality in France, where minimum wages increased and employment protection became stricter, but with an increase of up to 11% in the United States and United Kingdom, where unions became less powerful and (in the United States) minimum wages fell. Wage inequality is substantially lower in continental European countries than in the United States and United Fiingdom, and its evolution over time has differed greatly across countries. The same holds true for the skill (or education) wage premium. Changes in the supply of and demand for skills are unlikely to fully account for these marked differences (Acemoglu 2003). A substantial amount of research on wage inequality has examined the forces that may shift the rela tive demand for skills, such as changing trade patterns and skill-biased technical change. However, since developed economies operate in the same global environment, with inte grated trade and equal access to technology,

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We investigate the effects of two reforms of temporary employment using panel data on Italian firms. We exploit variation in their implementation across regions and sectors for identification. We find that the reform of apprenticeship contracts increased job turnover and induced the substitution of external staff with firms' apprentices, with an overall productivityenhancing effect. The reform of fixed-term contracts instead did not produce the intended results: it induced a substitution of temporary employees in favour of permanent ones and reduced capital intensity, generating productivity losses. We estimate substitution elasticities across types of temporary contracts that are consistent with these interpretations. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL-Code: J240, J410.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. Theory predicts that the wage effects of government-mandated severance payments depend on workers' and firms' relative bargaining power. This paper estimates the effect of employment protection legislation (EPL) on workers' individual wages in a quasi-experimental setting, exploiting a reform that introduced unjust-dismissal costs in Italy for firms below 15 employees and left firing costs unchanged for bigger firms. Accounting for the endogeneity of the treatment status, we find that high-bargaining power workers (stayers, white collar and workers above 45) are almost left unaffected by the increase in EPL, while low-bargaining power workers (movers, blue collar and young workers) suffer a drop both in the wage level and its growth rate.JEL Classification: E24, J3, J65

In this paper we suggest a simple decomposition of the correlation coefficient of education to account for different intergenerational mobility of subgroups of the population, which is of key importance from a policy persepective.Focussing on the interesting Italian case, we show that the high persistence of educational attainment found in the data is due to a much larger probability of obtaining a college degree of children of highly educated fathers.

" Exploiting information from a panel of European firms we study the joint effect of EPL and financial market imperfections on investment, capital-labour substitution, labour productivity and job reallocation. We find that EPL reduces investment per worker, capital per worker and value added per worker in high reallocation sectors relative to low reallocation sectors, while increasing the average frequency at which firms adjust their capital stock. The reduction in capital per worker and value added per worker is less pronounced in financially sound firms. Also, the propensity to invest appears to increase only in firms that are likely to be financially unconstrained. Overall, poor access to credit markets seems to exacerbate the negative effects of EPL on capital deepening and productivity". Copyright (c) CEPR, CES, MSH, 2010.