In this paper, a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of one manufacturer and one supplier is considered. The capacity of the manufacturer is limited, the manufacturer can increase capacity by investing in capacity, and there are different cooperation contracts among the supply chain members. This paper pushes collecting activities upstream, assumes that the collecting activity can be completed by the supplier, and accepts that there is cooperation between the members, which increases supplier involvement. Dynamic game models among CLSC members are formulated. The optimal decisions of pricing, capacity investment, and collecting channels of the CLSC members are obtained, and the impacts of some important factors, for example, the capacity investment cost coefficient and the cost-sharing factors, on optimal decisions are investigated. The results reveal that the supplier collecting mode performs better in some scenarios; therefore, the management enlightenment desired by the supplier can be obtained. Additionally, the coordination between the manufacturer and the supplier sometimes fails to increase the closed-loop supply chain’s sustainability, which is a finding quite different from some current research results.
In the current context of resource scarcity and increased pollution, enterprises need to better allocate capacity and achieve carbon emission reduction. We examine the optimal decision problem for a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) considering capacity constraints and stochastic demand under a cap-and-trade system. A two-level CLSC comprising a supplier and a manufacturer is established. To make the model more realistic, we treat demand as a random variable, consider the manufacturer’s production capacity within a certain upper limit, and allow the manufacturer to make investments to expand capacity to complete production demand. Based on this CLSC, the collection activities of the supplier and manufacturer are considered. Meanwhile, government carbon limits and carbon trading controls on the manufacturer are considered based on carbon reduction by enterprises. Through modeling and analysis, optimal decisions are derived for the amount of capacity investment, level of carbon emission reduction, and collection price variables. The results indicate that supplier collection has a positive effect on the sustainability of the CLSC. Moreover, the government’s carbon quota and carbon trading control of manufacturers can effectively reduce the carbon emissions of the CLSC, encourage enterprises to reduce carbon emissions, and improve the sustainability of the CLSC.
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