Alarm signals are a common feature of social species and are thought to be a means of alerting others to an external threat (e.g., Gill & Bierema, 2013;Kaplan, 2014;Townsend & Manser, 2013). Among cooperatively breeding mammals and birds, individuals may give an alarm call in the presence of natural enemies, thereby allowing others to take defensive action, ranging from hiding to mobbing the intruder (Caro, 2005). The different responses to alarm calls indicate that they can convey specific information about the nature of the threat, including the kind and proximity of the predator, allowing the receivers to respond appropriately. For example, the alarm calls of vervet monkeys Chlorocebus pygerythrus differ according to the threat: avian predators elicit "eagle" calls and receivers then hide in bushes, while receivers move into trees when they hear "leopard" calls (Seyfarth et al., 1980). Thus, alarm calls are thought to have "functional reference" (Evans, 1997;Macedonia & Evans, 1993), where the receivers react to the alarm calls similarly to how they would react to the threat itself (

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The dilemma of global public issues is a grave challenge, characterized by conflicts between rich and poor nations, and a lack of national consensus on future benefits. The impact of initial wealth heterogeneity on the emergence of cooperation in collective risk dilemmas has been a topic of intense debate. In this study, we examine the impact of endogenous endowment heterogeneity on cooperation in collective risk dilemmas. Using a two-stage game model with endogenous endowments, we investigate the dynamics of cooperation and the potential stable-state composition of the population under various parameters. Simulation results show that a higher risk probability leads to greater investment. Besides, cooperative behavior thrives when individuals are encouraged to achieve higher targets by setting small contribution ratios in multiple stages. Moreover, the promotion of cooperation by the benefit coefficient of the first-stage public goods game is influenced by the second-stage contribution ratio. Generally, a higher enhancement factor increases the likelihood of averting risk. However, when the contribution ratio is in the middle range, a moderate level of the enhancement factor yields the best performance in terms of risk aversion. Our findings have offered some information for real-life collective risk games that involve economic game relations between countries.

With the deepening of the theory and practice of industry-academy-research cooperation, the collaborative innovation of industry-university-research(IUR) has become the strategic measure to enhance the national independent innovation ability. Based on this, this paper summarizes the concept and process of collaborative innovation and knowledge transfer, and proposes that the process of knowledge transfer across different organizations can be divided into three stages: knowledge sharing, knowledge evaluation and knowledge absorption, and then builds the SECI theoretical model of knowledge transfer based on collaborative innovation process. By analyzing the characteristics of knowledge transfer in IUR collaborative innovation, this paper explores the process essence of IUR institute collaborative innovation and puts forward relevant countermeasures and suggestions to improve the knowledge transfer level and promote collaborative innovation.

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