we were junior academics involved in editing a collection of documents regarding the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor. Having served as junior officers in the US Naval Reserve during the Second World War, we had long been interested in understanding how Japan achieved its overwhelming victory in the Pearl Harbor raid. Our interest was to learn whether some dereliction of duty, error in judgment, or other cause had contributed to its terrible costs in lives and material.Admiral Stark agreed to meet with us, though he cautioned that everything he knew was available in the more than thirty "Parts" of the Joint Congressional Committee's Pearl Harbor Attack, which of course had already become our principal source. 1 Those volumes contained his sworn testimony at all of the Pearl Harbor hearings in which he had appeared as a witness; on the other hand, he mentioned that he might be of assistance by highlighting evidence he regarded as revelatory and by discussing various problems in the testimony. We were delighted to have this opportunity to spend time in conversation with one of the war's principal figures.The interview was friendly and relaxed but probing. Though gleaning no new information, we gained a respect for the clarity of the Admiral's vivid recall of decisions and events that were then almost twenty years old. After ninety minutes or so of spirited inquiry and analysis, we rose and, still chatting with the Admiral, moved slowly toward the front hall to make our departure. As we approached the door, Admiral Stark stopped abruptly, paused in silence momentarily, and then made a 1 Admiral Harold R. Stark, letter to Paul S. Burtness and Warren U. Ober, 31 May 1961. The letter is in our possession. See below, pp.587-88.
In the late 1950s and early 60s we became interested in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, its background, and its aftermath. Our research, which involved interviews with Admirals Husband E. Kimmel, Harold R. Stark, and Thomas C. Hart, among other principals, and correspondence with a number of others, including Admirals Hart and Kimmel and General Lewis Brereton, resulted in several publications. More than once in our studies we encountered an unanswered question, albeit one not about Pearl Harbor itself. It was this: how could it happen, hours after that disaster and despite repeated warnings from Washington, that General Douglas MacArthur and his command in the Philippines were not prepared for the attack there and, especially, why were the planes at Clark Field and other fields not used more effectively against the Japanese? Why were so many planes at Clark Field destroyed on the ground?
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