We evaluate and summarize the large body of audit fee research and use meta-analysis to test the combined effect of the most commonly used independent variables. The perspective provided by the meta-analysis allows us to reconsider the anomalies, mixed results, and gaps in audit fee research. We find that, although many independent variables have consistent results, several show no clear pattern to the results and others only show significant results in certain periods or particular countries. These variables include a loss by the client and leverage, which have become significant in comparatively recent studies; internal auditing and governance, both of which have mixed results; auditor specialization, regarding which there is still some uncertainty; and the audit opinion, which was a significant variable before 1990 but not in more recent studies.
SUMMARY This study presents a review of academic research on audit quality. We begin with a review of existing definitions of audit quality and describe general frameworks for establishing audit quality. Next, we summarize research on indicators of audit quality such as inputs, process, and outcomes. Finally, we offer some suggestions for future research. The study should be useful to academics interested in audit quality as well as to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and other regulators.
Previous studies generally suggest that internal control and external auditing can substitute for each other, so that better internal control will be associated with lower audit fees. However, their empirical results do not support this view. In contrast, previous studies of the interaction between corporate governance and external audit services often assume that they are complementary, and that improved governance is associated with higher audit fees, although the evidence about this issue is also mixed. We examine whether the 'substitution' or 'complementary controls' views apply. We find that measures of internal auditing, corporate governance, and concentration of ownership are all positively related to audit fees, consistent with the explanation that controls are complementary. The study makes a contribution by assisting regulators in understanding the effects of regulation of corporate governance, and by showing auditors and auditing standard setters that the view that internal controls can substitute for external auditing may not be helpful. We also find that these relationships hold only in a relatively less-regulated environment. SUMMARYMost previous research that examined relationships among external audits and other sources of control (e.g., internal auditing) is based on an assumption that decisions about risk reduction reflect the potential substitution of one control for another. In contrast, previous studies of the interaction between corporate governance and external audit services often suggest that they are complementary, although the evidence on this issue is also mixed. We present arguments that controls, governance and auditing are complements, not substitutes, and that an increase in one will lead to an increase in the others. Our results are consistent with these propositions. This issue of the relationship between internal control and audit fees is of interest because there are two contrary views expressed in the literature regarding internal control on the one hand and Correspondence to David Hay,
The process for providing accounting information to the public has not changed much in the last century even though the extent of disclosure has increased signifi-cantly. Sundem et al. (1996) suggest that the primary benefit of audited financial statements may not be decision usefulness but the discipline imposed by timely confirmation of previously available information. In general, the value of information from the audited financial statement will decline as the audit report lag (the time period between a company's fiscal year end and the date of the audit report) increases since competitively oriented users may obtain substitute sources of information. Furthermore, the literature on earnings quality and earnings management suggests that unexpected reporting delays may be associated with lower quality information. The purpose of this paper is to extend our understanding about the determinants of audit report lag using a proprietary database containing 226 audit engagements from an international public accounting firm. We examine three previously uninvestigated audit firm factors that potentially influence audit report lag and are controllable by the auditor: (1) incremental audit effort (e.g., hours), (2) the resource allocation of audit team effort measured by rank (partner, manager, or staff), and (3) the provision of nonaudit services (MAS and tax). The results indicate that incremental audit effort, the presence of contentious tax issues, and the use of less experienced audit staff are positively correlated with audit report lag. Further, audit report lag is decreased by the potential synergistic relationship between MAS and audit services.
SUMMARY The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) effectively bars an auditor from providing nonaudit services to an audit client based on the belief that the resulting economic bonding undermines the auditor's independence and quality of the audit (U.S. House of Representatives 2002). The accounting profession has strongly debated this view and counter-argues that auditor-provided nonaudit services benefit the client. We contribute to this debate by examining the effect of auditor-provided nonaudit services on the effectiveness and efficiency of the audit. We find that higher nonaudit service fees are associated with shorter audit report lags—a potential indicator of audit efficiency—prior to the passage of SOX, but such effects dissipate after SOX. We find that discretionary accruals and financial restatements—potential indicators of audit effectiveness—do not increase when shorter audit lags occur in conjunction with high nonaudit service fees. We also find that the firms with the highest levels of nonaudit service fees prior to SOX have the largest increase in audit lags after SOX. These results suggest that there is some merit to the profession's argument that auditor-provided nonaudit services benefit clients without leading to a loss of audit effectiveness. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources identified in the text.
The debate continues about the relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality in spite of extensive empirical evidence examining audit failures, earnings management, and the issuance of auditor's opinions. Most recent evidence suggests that long auditor tenure does not have a negative impact on audit quality. However, most of the available evidence has been accumulated based on publicly listed companies in the U.S. We examine the effect of auditor tenure on audit quality for private companies in Belgium, an environment where we believe auditor tenure is more likely to have a negative effect on audit quality. We use the likelihood of an auditor issuing a going concern opinion as an indicator of audit quality. Using a sample of stressed bankrupt companies, and stressed nonbankrupt companies, the results indicate that auditors do not become less independent over time nor do they become better at predicting bankruptcy. In balance, the evidence for tenure either increasing or decreasing quality is weak.
This paper investigates managers' economic incentives for voluntary reporting on risk management and internal control using a sample of publicly traded firms in The Netherlands in the late 1990s. In this particular setting, internal control reporting was voluntary and covered a wide business-based approach as defined in key internal control frameworks. We create an index to measure the extent of disclosure by identifying six reportable items related to internal control. Regarding managers' incentives to report, we hypothesize that voluntary disclosure increases with the extent of information and agency problems, as proxied by management and block holder ownership and financial leverage. Supporting our hypotheses, we find a negative relationship between the extent of internal control disclosure and management and block holder ownership, and positive relationship between the extent of disclosure and financial leverage. We interpret these findings as evidence for a conscious trade-off by managers, which is linked to the costs and benefits of making internal control disclosures. Additionally, we find some evidence that the extent of disclosure varies with firms' inherent risk exposure, as proxied by a number of firm operating characteristics. One implication of our findings is that regulators may wish to allow firms flexibility in their internal control reporting choice, as firms take a broad approach to internal control that goes beyond SOX-based regulations, and tailor their internal control reports to suit their specific environments.
This paper analyzes the auditor choices for a sample of 2,333 predominantly small and mid-sized Finnish firms. Finland requires virtually all commercial enterprises to have a financial statement audit, but allows the smallest firms to choose from four types of audit firms: first tier international firms, first tier national firms, second tier local auditors and non-certified auditors. We find that among the smallest firms, the choice to hire a certified auditor relates to the level of complexity in the organization as measured by size and extent of workforce. For firms that must use a certified auditor, we find that the choice between a first tier and second tier firm is related to size, the extent of debt financing, and complexity associated with being a member of an associated group. Finally, in the upper end of the market, the decision to hire a large international firm relates to size, the need for financing, be it equity or debt, and complexity due to a broad labour force. This pattern is interesting because it indicates that the need for a higher quality auditor is driven first by complexity, then as the firm grows, it is supplemented by the use of debt financing and ultimately by the need to raise equity as well as debt financing.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.