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The article systematically analyses the Ukrainian behaviour within the EU-Ukraine-Russia triangle during the presidency of Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004). As it is shown, this was a period to which the origins of many recent, and tumultuous, developments can be traced. We utilise an interdisciplinary Foreign Policy Analysis role theoretical framework, and through the means of triangulated content analysis apply it to the empirical material containing, inter alia, primary data in the Ukrainian language. As we demonstrate empirically, Ukraine followed a certain behavioural pattern of roles based on its national characteristics, collective cognition, discursive uses of historical developments, and specific internal political, economic and social considerations. An extensive analysis of presidential speeches reveals that the prominent role of ‘Internal Development’ had fluctuating levels of intensity and multiple manifestations. Taking advantages of conceptual vocabulary and theoretical subtleties associated with role theory, we conclude that the performed research of these sets of behavioural norms and their dynamics allows for better understanding of Ukrainian collective identity and behaviour within this strategic complex.

This article analyses to what extent the Visegrad dimension of the Czech foreign policy can be considered a legitimate Czech national interest. The temporal framework of the study is driven by the paradigm shift in Visegrad cooperation in the context of the 2015 European migration crisis – from ‘inclusive’ (1991– early 2015) to ‘defensive’ (late 2015–present). Building on the conceptual framework for the legitimacy of national interest, I focused on the first period of cooperation and analysed whether the Visegrad dimension had internal and external legitimacy. Through a mixed method research design, I show that the topic of Visegrad is a long-discussed and advocated policy which has been present throughout the existence of the independent Czech state, regardless of the nature of the political leadership. As I demonstrate empirically, the Czech interest in the Visegrad policy is supported by Czech policy makers, it is acceptable for the other members, and it is compatible with the national interests of other democratic partners in the European and Euro-Atlantic area. The Visegrad policy can be considered as being in the legitimate Czech national interest during the first period of Visegrad cooperation.