accessible en ligne : http://eup.sagepub.com/content/13/2/293International audienceThe theory of issue evolution predicts that the dimensional space of party competition is simple. We contrast this prediction with the expectation that a complicated multiparty system, such as the one in France, produces a more complicated dimensional structure. To test this claim, we examine the longitudinal structure of the policy preferences that underlie public opinion in France. Using surveys of preferences as a basic data source, we are able to extract two latent dimensions that almost fully explain the reported preferences. Both dimensions are defined by the left-right structure of the French party system. Whereas one is the traditional socioeconomic domain, the other comprises a wide array of new cultural issues. The orthogonal solution, however, does not produce the expected socioeconomic and cultural dimensions. Thus we impose our prior belief in the socioeconomic and cultural content and rotate the two dimensions independently to maximize fit with the two prior dimensions. We show that the same two-dimensional structure is also present in cross-sectional data, and can be used to position parties in the two-dimensional space. Moreover, we find that the two dimensions are closely connected, despite their completely different content. The explanation, which arises from the theory of issue evolution, is that the meaning of left-right is dynamic as well as elastic and incorporates new issues as they arise

The debate over the relative importance of ideology versus party for vote choice in France is enduring. Resolution of the debate would have much value, for the light shed on sources of stability and change in multiparty electoral systems generally. The main reason the debate continues is that previous studies examining that question have been plagued by difficulties pertaining to variable measurement, model specification, election type, and research design. We address these problems and provide new evidence from the 2002 French Electoral Panel. Most notably, these data allow stronger causal inference because party identification and ideological identification are both measured in the first wave of the survey, that is, before the declaration of vote actually occurs. We estimate a multi-equation model of first-round legislative vote intention—as measured in the second wave of the panel—using two-stage least squares, ordered logit, as well as binomial and multinomial logit techniques. The results indicate that ideological identification systematically outweighs party identification in shaping the French voter’s choice.

On the 11 th of January 2015, France experienced its largest demonstration since World War Two, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against Charlie Hebdo and the Hyper Casher supermarket. Rapidly though the profiles and motivations of the participants to the rallies were questioned. Were they "good citizens" marching in defense of freedom of expression, tolerance and republican values? Or were they actually expressing their rejection of Islam and Muslims, as suggested by the demographer Emmanuel Todd (2015)? To answer these questions this article takes a social movement approach and draws from the data of a national opinion poll conducted two months after the attacks. First, the results show that the "Charlie" in the streets had the usual profile of demonstrators mobilized on post-materialist issues: They were overrepresented among young, urban, educated, leftwing, and tolerant citizens. Second, they highlight the importance of the religious factor: Muslims were less inclined to say they had participated to the rallies, and practicing Catholics to say they wished they had. Last, they show that terrorism does not automatically trigger an authoritarian dynamic, on the contrary. Its effects depend on how the issue is framed in social and political discourses.Keywords: Social movements; terrorism; Charlie-Hebdo; politics; religion Le 11 janvier 2015, les attentats contre Charlie Hebdo et l'Hyper Casher ont suscité les plus grandes manifestations que la France ait connues depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Assez vite cependant le profil et les motivations des manifestants ont été mis en cause. S'agissait-il de "bons citoyens" marchant pour la défense de la liberté d'expression, de la tolérance et des valeurs républicaines? Ou n'exprimaient-ils pas plutôt leur rejet de l'Islam et des Musulmans, comme le suggérait le démographe Emmanuel Todd (2015)? Pour répondre à ces questions cet article, inscrit dans la sociologie des mouvements sociaux, s'appuie sur les données d'une enquête nationale par sondage conduite deux mois après les attentats. Les résultats montrent, d'abord, que les manifestants pro "Charlie" avaient le profil habituel des manifestants mobilisés pour des causes post-matérialistes : surreprésentation des citoyens jeunes, urbains, instruits, de gauche et tolérants. Ensuite ils soulignent l'importance du facteur religieux. Les Musulmans ont été moins enclins à dire qu'ils avaient manifesté, et les Catholiques pratiquants à dire qu'ils auraient souhaité le faire. Ils montrent enfin que le terrorisme ne déclenche pas automatiquement une dynamique autoritaire, au contraire. Tout dépend de la manière dont le problème est cadré dans les discours socio-politiques.

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