When corporations decide on the use of debt finance, they are reallocating some expected future cash flows away from equity claimants in exchange for cash up front. The factors that drive this decision remain elusive despite a vast theoretical literature and decades of empirical tests. This stems in part from the fact that many of the empirical studies are aimed at providing support for a particular theory. The amount of evidence is large, and so it is often all too easy to provide some empirical support for almost any idea. This is fine for a given paper but more problematic for the overall development of our understanding of capital structure decisions. As a result, in recent decades the literature has not had a solid empirical basis to distinguish the strengths and the weaknesses of the main theories.Which theories shall we take seriously? Naturally, opinions differ. Many theories of capital structure have been proposed. But only a few seem to have many advocates. Notably, most corporate finance textbooks point to the "trade-off theory" in which taxation and deadweight bankruptcy costs are key. Myers (1984) proposed the "pecking order theory" in which there is a financing hierarchy of retained earnings, debt, and then equity. Recently, the idea that firms engage in "market timing" has become popular. Finally, agency theory lurks in the background of much theoretical discussion. Agency concerns are often lumped into the trade-off framework broadly interpreted.Advocates of these models frequently point to empirical evidence to support their preferred theory. Often reference is made to the survey by Harris and Raviv (1991) or to the empirical study

We test the pecking order theory of corporate leverage on a broad cross-section of publicly traded American firms for 1971 to 1998. Contrary to the pecking order theory, net equity issues track the financing deficit more closely than do net debt issues. While large firms exhibit some aspects of pecking order behavior, the evidence is not robust to the inclusion of conventional leverage factors, nor to the analysis of evidence from the 1990s. Financing deficit is less important in explaining net debt issues over time for firms of all sizes. r

This paper examines the relative importance of many factors in the capital structure decisions of publicly traded American firms from 1950 to 2003. The most reliable factors for explaining market leverage are: median industry leverage (+ effect on leverage), market‐to‐book assets ratio (−), tangibility (+), profits (−), log of assets (+), and expected inflation (+). In addition, we find that dividend‐paying firms tend to have lower leverage. When considering book leverage, somewhat similar effects are found. However, for book leverage, the impact of firm size, the market‐to‐book ratio, and the effect of inflation are not reliable. The empirical evidence seems reasonably consistent with some versions of the trade‐off theory of capital structure.

We test the pecking order theory of corporate leverage on a broad cross-section of publicly traded American firms for 1971 to 1998. Contrary to the pecking order theory, net equity issues track the financing deficit more closely than do net debt issues. While large firms exhibit some aspects of pecking order behavior, the evidence is not robust to the inclusion of conventional leverage factors, nor to the analysis of evidence from the 1990s. Financing deficit is less important in explaining net debt issues over time for firms of all sizes. r

We examine whether differences in legal protection affect the size, maturity, and interest rate spread on loans to borrowers in 48 countries. Results show that banks respond to poor enforceability of contracts by reducing loan amounts, shortening loan maturities, and increasing loan spreads. These effects are both statistically significant and economically large. While stronger creditor rights reduce spreads, they do not seem to matter for loan size and maturity. Overall, we show that variation in enforceability of contracts matters a great deal more to how loans are structured and how they are priced. Copyright (c) 2009 the American Finance Association.

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We use a real options approach to evaluate the performance of several proxy variables for a firm's investment opportunity set. The results show that, on a relative scale, the market-to-book assets ratio has the highest information content with respect to investment opportunities. Although both the market-to-book equity and the earnings-price ratios are related to investment opportunities, they do not contain information that is not already contained in the market-to-book assets ratio. Consistent with this finding, a common factor constructed from several proxy variables does not improve the performance of the market-to-book assets ratio. 2008 The Southern Finance Association and the Southwestern Finance Association.

Do bank debtholders discipline excessive risk taking? I investigate this question by examining how a bank's incentives to take risks affect offering yield spreads and restrictive covenants in their debt contracts. Results suggest that bank charter values, which determine a bank's risk taking incentives, significantly affect the likelihood of restrictive covenants in bank debt contracts. This effect is most pronounced during the 1980s, when greater competition and relatively less stringent regulation increased the severity of moral hazard problems in the U.S. banking industry. Overall, the results suggest that an important channel for market investors to discipline bank risk taking is through writing restrictive covenants in bank debt.