When corporations decide on the use of debt finance, they are reallocating some expected future cash flows away from equity claimants in exchange for cash up front. The factors that drive this decision remain elusive despite a vast theoretical literature and decades of empirical tests. This stems in part from the fact that many of the empirical studies are aimed at providing support for a particular theory. The amount of evidence is large, and so it is often all too easy to provide some empirical support for almost any idea. This is fine for a given paper but more problematic for the overall development of our understanding of capital structure decisions. As a result, in recent decades the literature has not had a solid empirical basis to distinguish the strengths and the weaknesses of the main theories.Which theories shall we take seriously? Naturally, opinions differ. Many theories of capital structure have been proposed. But only a few seem to have many advocates. Notably, most corporate finance textbooks point to the "trade-off theory" in which taxation and deadweight bankruptcy costs are key. Myers (1984) proposed the "pecking order theory" in which there is a financing hierarchy of retained earnings, debt, and then equity. Recently, the idea that firms engage in "market timing" has become popular. Finally, agency theory lurks in the background of much theoretical discussion. Agency concerns are often lumped into the trade-off framework broadly interpreted.Advocates of these models frequently point to empirical evidence to support their preferred theory. Often reference is made to the survey by Harris and Raviv (1991) or to the empirical study

We test the pecking order theory of corporate leverage on a broad cross-section of publicly traded American firms for 1971 to 1998. Contrary to the pecking order theory, net equity issues track the financing deficit more closely than do net debt issues. While large firms exhibit some aspects of pecking order behavior, the evidence is not robust to the inclusion of conventional leverage factors, nor to the analysis of evidence from the 1990s. Financing deficit is less important in explaining net debt issues over time for firms of all sizes. r

This paper examines the relative importance of many factors in the capital structure decisions of publicly traded American firms from 1950 to 2003. The most reliable factors for explaining market leverage are: median industry leverage (+ effect on leverage), market‐to‐book assets ratio (−), tangibility (+), profits (−), log of assets (+), and expected inflation (+). In addition, we find that dividend‐paying firms tend to have lower leverage. When considering book leverage, somewhat similar effects are found. However, for book leverage, the impact of firm size, the market‐to‐book ratio, and the effect of inflation are not reliable. The empirical evidence seems reasonably consistent with some versions of the trade‐off theory of capital structure.

Financial press reports claim that Internet stock message boards can move markets. We study the effect of more than 1.5 million messages posted on Yahoo! Finance and Raging Bull about the 45 companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the Dow Jones Internet Index. Bullishness is measured using computational linguistics methods. Wall Street Journal news stories are used as controls. We find that stock messages help predict market volatility. Their effect on stock returns is statistically significant but economically small. Consistent with Harris and Raviv (1993), disagreement among the posted messages is associated with increased trading volume. * Both authors are at the Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia. We would like to thank