Abstract. Few seem to have difficulty in distinguishing between religious and secular institutions, yet there is widespread disagreement regarding what "religion" actually means. Indeed, some go so far as to question whether there is anything at all distinctive about religions. Hence, formulating a definition of "religion" that can command wide assent has proven to be an extremely difficult task. In this article, I consider the most prominent of the many rival definitions that have been proposed, the majority falling within three basic types: intellectual, affective and functional definitions. I conclude that there are pragmatic reasons for favouring the formerly popular view that essentialist definitions of "religions" are inadequate, and that religions should be construed, instead, as possessing a number of "family resemblances." In so arguing, I provide a response to the view that there is nothing distinctive about religions, as well as to the recent claim that religions do not exist.
This article applies Hilary Putnam's theory of internal realism to the issue of religious plurality.The result of this application-"internalist pluralism"-constitutes a paradigm shift within the Philosophy of Religion. Moreover, internalist pluralism succeeds in avoiding the major difficulties faced by John Hick's famous theory of religious pluralism, which views God, or "the Real", as the noumenon lying behind diverse religious phenomena. In side-stepping the difficulties besetting Hick's revolutionary Kantian approach, without succumbing to William Alston's critique of conceptual-scheme dependence, internalist pluralism provides a solution to significant theoretical problems, while doing so in a manner that is respectful of cultural diversity and religious sensitivities.As societies become increasingly multicultural, there progressively arises a need for an appropriate theory that is capable of making sense of the various difficulties presented by religious diversity. To be precise, what seems to be required at this historical juncture is a theory of religious pluralism that is suitably sensitive to the challenge posed by cultural diversity, while remaining respectful of religious differences.
Until recently philosophy of religion has been almost exclusively focused upon the analysis of western religious ideas. The central concern of the discipline has been the concept "God", as that concept has been understood within JudaeoChristianity. However, this narrow remit threatens to render philosophy of religion irrelevant today. To avoid this philosophy of religion should become a genuinely multicultural discipline. But how, if at all, can philosophy of religion rise to this challenge? The paper considers fictionalism about religious discourse as a possible methodological standpoint from which to practice a tradition-neutral form of philosophy of religion. However, after examining some of the problems incurred by fictionalism, the paper concludes that fictionalism and religious diversity are uneasy bedfellows; which implies that fictionalism is unlikely to be the best theory to shape the practice of philosophy of religion in a multicultural context.
Abstract:Is it possible to talk about God without either misrepresentation or failing to assert anything of significance? The article begins by reviewing how, in attempting to answer this question, traditional theories of religious language have failed to sidestep both potential pitfalls adequately. After arguing that recently developed theories of metaphor seem better able to shed light on the nature of religious language, it considers the claim that huge areas of our language and, consequently, of our experience are shaped by metaphors. Finally, it considers some of the more significant implications of this claim for our understanding of both religious language and religious experience. 1 Metaphor, Religious Language and Religious ExperienceIs it possible to talk about God 1 without either misrepresentation or failing to assert anything of significance? In an attempt to answer this question, I begin by reviewing how traditional theories of religious language have failed to sidestep both potential pitfalls adequately. I then turn to recent developments in the theory of metaphor-developments that seem better able to explain how speakers are capable of referring to God successfully without having to misrepresent the divine.Before proceeding, however, some clarification of the term 'religious language' is required. 'Religious language', as employed by religious scholars in the everyday sense, refers to the written and spoken language typically used by religious believers when they talk about their religious beliefs and their religious experiences. The term also covers the language used in sacred texts and in worship and prayer. 2 Use of the term 'religious language' might suggest that there is a special 'religious' component of natural languages, which is easily distinguishable from the normal, secular component of these languages. This, however, is clearly not the case. For when believers employ 'religious language', they do not use completely different words to those uttered by their non-religious contemporaries. 3 While certain words may be uttered by believers with greater frequency than by atheists, nonetheless, the words that feature in 'religious language' are the same words that are used in 'non-religious language'. 4 Even a word as quintessentially religious as 'God' appears in the language of many non-religious people in the context of a variety of commonly used curses.Moreover, if one were to open a page of the scriptures of Judaism, Christianity or Islam most of the words on that page would seem to bear the same mundane meaning as they do in ordinary, 'secular' discourse. In short, it would seem that the religiosity of language cannot lie in the actual words used but in something else. I suggest that that the 'something else' consists principally, although not exclusively, in two factors: first, the 'religious' purpose some language serves, and, secondly, the overtly 'religious' context of some linguistic uses.The term 'religious language', as used here, then, should be regarded as shorthand for 'la...
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