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However, the 20th century has seen a debate as to whether general intelligence-the capacity to reason abstractly and acquire knowledge-is more important than an intelligence with a narrower focus, a type of intelligence called broad intelligence. The concept of general and broad intelligences comes from the Cattell-Horn-Carroll model, which posits three levels or "strata" of intelligence. Stratum 3 is general intelligence, labeled g, followed by a series of what are labeled broad intelligences (e.g., fluid reasoning, processing speed); last, Stratum 1 consists of narrow intelligences (e.g., memory span, reading speed; Schipolowski, Wilhelm, & Schroeders, 2014). To be considered a form of intelligence, a mental ability has to be both related to other such abilities but also be different enough to warrant calling it a separate form of intelligence. In our view, EI and PI are broad intelligences-occupying the "just right" space where they are both related to and distinct enough from general intelligence.Broad intelligences are a focus of research for three reasons. First, mathematical models that include both general and broad intelligences fit data better than models that use general intelligence alone (Carroll, 1993;McGrew, 2009;Schneider & Newman, 2015). Second, general intelligence itself is estimated from measures of broad intelligences; it is, therefore, possible to measure, model, and use both at once (Schneider & Newman, 2015). Third, broad intelligences modestly enhance prediction of performance over general intelligence alone (Mayer & Skimmyhorn, 2015;Schneider & Newman, 2015).Understandably, some intelligence researchers ask whether there are too many intelligences (Hedlund & Sternberg, 2000), and the introduction of PI and EI exacerbates this issue. One way to address this problem is to speak of people-centered intelligence and thing-centered intelligence, where EI and PI are a form of people-centered intelligence and more traditional broad intelligences are characterized as involving "things," such as visual-processing and quantitative reasoning. Data exist to suggest empirical evidence of the differential prediction of these two classes of mental ability (Mayer, 2018;Mayer & Skimmyhorn, 2017). EMOTIONAL AND PERSONAL INTELLIGENCESWhen two speculative articles were published in 1990 proposing the existence of an emotional intelligence (Salovey & Mayer, 1990), much was unknown about this new intelligence, and the idea did not receive much attention. However, the idea of emotional intelligence entered the public sphere in 1995 when a book aimed at the general public by that name was published (Goleman, 1995). The book received a great deal of press (e.g., Gibbs, 1995).

The Cattell–Horn–Carroll (CHC) or three-stratum model of intelligence envisions human intelligence as a hierarchy. General intelligence (g) is situated at the top, under which are a group of broad intelligences such as verbal, visuospatial processing, and quantitative knowledge that pertain to more specific areas of reasoning. Some broad intelligences are people-centered, including personal, emotional, and social intelligences; others concern reasoning about things more generally, such as visuospatial and quantitative knowledge. In the present research, we conducted a meta-analysis of 87 studies, including 2322 effect sizes, to examine the average correlation between people-to-people intelligences relative to the average correlation between people-to-thing-centered intelligences (and similar comparisons). Results clearly support the psychometric distinction between people-centered and thing-centered mental abilities. Coupled with evidence for incremental predictions from people-centered intelligences, our findings provide a secure foundation for continued research focused on people-centered mental abilities.

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