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Does a recently introduced ability scale adequately measure emotional intelligence (EI) skills? Using the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; J. D. Mayer, P. Salovey, & D. R. Caruso, 2002b), the authors examined (a) whether members of a general standardization sample and emotions experts identified the same test answers as correct, (b) the test's reliability, and (c) the possible factor structures of EI. Twenty-one emotions experts endorsed many of the same answers, as did 2,112 members of the standardization sample, and exhibited superior agreement, particularly when research provides clearer answers to test questions (e.g., emotional perception in faces). The MSCEIT achieved reasonable reliability, and confirmatory factor analysis supported theoretical models of EI. These findings help clarify issues raised in earlier articles published in Emotion.

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Some individuals have a greater capacity than others to carry out sophisticated information processing about emotions and emotion-relevant stimuli and to use this information as a guide to thinking and behavior. The authors have termed this set of abilities emotional intelligence (EI). Since the introduction of the concept, however, a schism has developed in which some researchers focus on EI as a distinct group of mental abilities, and other researchers instead study an eclectic mix of positive traits such as happiness, self-esteem, and optimism. Clarifying what EI is and is not can help the field by better distinguishing research that is truly pertinent to EI from research that is not. EI--conceptualized as an ability--is an important variable both conceptually and empirically, and it shows incremental validity for predicting socially relevant outcomes.

This article presents several principles that have guided our thinking about emotional intelligence, some of them new. We have reformulated our original ability model here guided by these principles, clarified earlier statements of the model that were unclear, and revised portions of it in response to current research. In this revision, we also positioned emotional intelligence amidst other hot intelligences including personal and social intelligences, and examined the implications of the changes to the model. We discuss the present and future of the concept of emotional intelligence as a mental ability.

2001) questioned whether that claim was warranted. The central issue raised by Roberts et al. concerning Mayer et al. (1999) is whether there are correct answers to questions on tests purporting to measure EI as a set of abilities. To address this issue (and others), the present authors briefly restate their view of intelligence, emotion, and EI. They then present arguments for the reasonableness of measuring EI as an ability, indicate that correct answers exist, and summarize recent data suggesting that such measures are, indeed, reliable.