The purpose of this paper is to draw together the many different facets of corporate governance that have been examined in the extensive literature in both strategic management and finance. In particular, we are interested in the relationship between the typical agency theory constructs of monitoring, incentives and ownership structure, with financial performance. First, we catalog this large body of work to see where there are still unanswered questions. We find that previous work has generally focused on examining subsets of governance mechanisms, typically studying one or two governance variables in any one study. Our view is that the most critical issue still to examine, is the ability of firms to choose among a number of different governance mechanisms in order to create the appropriate structure for that firm, given the environment in which it operates. We identify a sample of firms and examine CEO compensation, CEO tenure, board composition, leadership structure and ownership structure and their contribution to both market performance, Market Value Added, and risk-adjusted accounting performance, Economic Value Added. In addition, we control for ownership by block-holders, industry performance, and firm size. We examine these measures both individually and as interactions. Our results indicate that while some of the traditional agency variables do impact performance, both individually and as interactions, industry performance is a strong and significant driver of performance for our sample of firms. We conclude that, while there is evidence to support that firms may use governance packages to deal with agency issues, further research could provide important evidence on these issues by focusing on examining a more refined, industry-level context.

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This paper describes a live ethics case project that can be used to teach ethics in a broad variety of business classes. The live case differs from regular cases in that it involves a current situation. Students select an on-going or current event that involves ethical violations and write a case about it. They then present their case and run a debate about the challenges and issues outlined in the case and the actions that could have or should have been taken. The dynamic project fulfills the key criteria for effective ethics education since it increases awareness of the complexity of ethical challenges, allows application of concepts, creates a personal emotional engagement in the case, is relevant, holds students accountable for their position, and creates a setting that encourages students to think critically about ethics. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006application of ethics, critical thinking, emotional engagement in ethics, increased awareness of ethics, live cases, student accountability, teaching ethics, teaching ethics in finance,

Studies that test for an average stock price effect of antitakeover amendments present different results, disagreeing with respect to both the significance and the direction of the effect. This study determines whether effects can be identified when managerial share ownership and amendment type are considered. Results suggest a negative relation between managerial share ownership and the stock price reaction to all but fair price amendment proposals. * Business Programs, ArizonaState University West. This paper is based on a dissertation written at the University of Oregon. I would like to thank Wayne Mikkelson, my dissertation chairperson, and the other committee members, Megan Partch, Peggy Wier, and Christopher Ellis, for their support and encouragement. I also thank Rene Stulz and an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions and comments. Support was provided in part by the Research and Scholarship Development Fund at Northeastern University. 1627 1628 The Journal of FinanceThe general finding of no significant average effect may be the result of two competing potential stock price effects of the amendments. On one hand, the amendments potentially increase managerial bargaining power for some firms in takeover bids, leading to the anticipation of a positive stock price effect. At the same time, they also appear to decrease the probability that takeover will occur for some firms, leading to a negative effect. When the stock price reaction to antitakeover amendment proposals is averaged across all firms, these competing effects may average to zero. The conclusion that average effects are not statistically different from zero, as reported by most existing studies, does not imply that antitakeover amendments have no effect on shareholder wealth of individual firms.This study tests the hypothesis that the wealth effect of the amendments depends on managerial share ownership and the type of amendment proposed. For firms with low managerial share ownership, the amendments' positive effect resulting from the increase in managerial bargaining power should outweigh the negative effect resulting from the decrease in the probability of takeover. The opposite is expected to occur for firms with high managerial share ownership. In addition, the relation between managerial share ownership and the amendment stock price reaction should depend on the type of amendment proposed since some amendments have a stronger effect on the probability of takeover than others. I begin my investigation by calculating the stock price effects of amendment proposals for 325 firms proposing amendments from 1980 through 1984. I then classify firms according to the percentage of managerial share ownership and the type of amendment proposed. Results indicate a benefit associated with the amendments for firms with low managerial share ownership when all but fair price amendments are proposed. As the ownership level increases, the stock price reaction to amendment proposals becomes negative. Section I of the paper briefly describes the types of anti...

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<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-indent: 0in; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; mso-pagination: none;"><span style="font-family: &quot;CG Times&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;; font-size: 10pt;">The goal of this manuscript is to help to improve the integrity of research that uses event study methodology.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>We discuss issues related to correctly performing event studies and, in some cases, provide alternatives to a variety of recommendations made by McWilliams and Siegel (1997) regarding the application of event study methodology. While McWilliams and Siegel provide a good starting point for providing guidance in the use of event study methodology, our revised recommendations add additional value beyond McWilliams and Siegel by being more consistent with statistical theory, existing research results, and accepted practice.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>These recommendations, along with those found in McWilliams and Siegel, should lead to higher quality research, regardless of the discipline to which event study methodology is applied.</span></p>