1990
DOI: 10.2307/2328754
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Managerial Share Ownership and the Stock Price Effects of Antitakeover Amendment Proposals

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Cited by 33 publications
(26 citation statements)
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“…While we expected a certain direction of each variable's movement in our hypotheses, variables could show unexpected movements which were statistically significant. In addition, because parametric test is quite sensitive to extreme outliers (McWilliams, 1990), this study also employed non-parametric tests such as Wilcoxon signed rank test and sign test. Tables 3-17 present the results of the certified firms' abnormal performance in terms of ROA, ROS, stock price, COGS/Sales, and Sales growth rate (SGR).…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While we expected a certain direction of each variable's movement in our hypotheses, variables could show unexpected movements which were statistically significant. In addition, because parametric test is quite sensitive to extreme outliers (McWilliams, 1990), this study also employed non-parametric tests such as Wilcoxon signed rank test and sign test. Tables 3-17 present the results of the certified firms' abnormal performance in terms of ROA, ROS, stock price, COGS/Sales, and Sales growth rate (SGR).…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) and Baghat and Jefferis (1991) find that companies' share values tend to decline when firms amend their charters to adopt an ATP. 4 McWilliams (1990) and McWilliams and Sen (1997) find that the effect of ATP amendments depends on the extent of inside ownership and control. The greater inside ownership and control are, the more negative the impact of an ATP.…”
Section: Prior Empirical Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To take into account this effect, we introduce a "DUMMY" variable which equals 1 if managerial ownership is more than 15%, otherwise it is zero. McWilliams (1990) justifies this threshold value by suggesting that managers begin to deviate from firm-value-maximizing behavior if the equity shares of managers are above 10% and below 20%.…”
Section: Managerial Ownershipmentioning
confidence: 96%