International audienceThis paper reviews the evidence on financing technology-based small firms (TBSFs) in Europe. European TBSFs finance new investments by relying primarily on internal funds, due to capital market failures induced by asymmetric information (...
An increase of the innovation contests and their associated prizes have been observed since the 90s especially in the US through the sponsorship of the American Federal Agencies. The purpose of this article is to shed light on some of the direct and indirect effects of US federal agency contests not only on economic dynamics but also on social dynamics. Based on recent case studies, this paper describes the various positive impacts that federal agency contests may have: i) contests may display a strong incentive effect ex-ante and during the contest; ii) they may produce favorable spillovers after the contests, at innovation and economic levels in specified economic/industry sectors and iii) they may also play a beneficial social role, contributing to citizens' education and awareness. Nevertheless, as a contest remains a sophisticated device, public decision makers must comply with certain requirements if they wish to benefit from this particular policy tool in order to spur innovation.
Selon la taxonomie évolutionniste des systèmes financiers proposée par Dosi (1990), les systèmes fondés sur les marchés seraient comparativement plus enclins à l’exploration de nouveaux paradigmes technologiques, résultant de la sélection par le marché, alors que les systèmes fondés sur le crédit apporteraient un avantage en termes d’apprentissage cumulatif. Cet article offre une réflexion préliminaire sur ces conjonctures à la lumière des changements institutionnels incarnés par la financiarisation et le principe de la « Maximisation de la Valeur Actionnariale ». L’empirie suggère que la financialisation a désolidarisé les performances des entreprises sur les marchés financiers des déterminants de l’innovation et de la croissance. La sélection parmi les entreprises se produit davantage sur les marchés financiers selon des critères de rendements de court terme. Ainsi, la financialisation a contribué à altérer et dégrader les propriétés spécifiques du nexus finance-innovation dans les deux archétypes de systèmes financiers, détériorant en même temps l’efficience statique et évolutionniste.
In 1996, two investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the American Department of Justice reported non-competitive practices among market makers on the NASDAQ. These reports also mentioned the influence of the NASDAQ social structure on market makers' behaviours. Most market makers adopted social norms in order to increase significantly their income at the expense of the customers. This paper aims to explain the rise and long-term effects of non-competitive practices, through the integration of a concrete view of "embeddedness" (Granovetter, 1985). We propose the use of game theory tools to achieve this goal. A rereading of Kreps' model of reputation sheds light on its structural dimension and illustrates the way social structure governs individual behaviours.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.