The Ukrainian crisis, which came into its active phase in February 2022, led to the collapse of Russia’s relations with many countries, and Japan was no exception. The Japanese government expressed strong criticism of Russia’s actions and joined the anti-Russian sanctions with, probably, most vigor, compared to any other Asian nation. This makes the question about the reasons for such course pursued by Tokyo vis-à-vis Russia a particularly timely one. In Russia, there is a widespread opinion that such position held by Tokyo is caused mostly by pressure from the United States. Yet such view seems to be a gross simplification. This article attempts to analyze the positions of various participants of the Japanese foreign policy making process about the events unfolding in Ukraine. It shows that, even though all key parties, irrespective of their political orientation, take a critical stance towards the actions of the Russian Federation, their statements show some nuances reflecting their ideological priorities. For example, the ruling LDP emphasizes solidarity with the US; its junior coalition partner, Komeito, stresses humanitarian aspects and the role of the UN; the Japan Innovation Party criticizes the government for indecisiveness and calls for more active military policy, while the left-wing populist Reiwa Shinsengumi even refused to support the relevant Diet resolution to demonstrate its principled stance to the voters. There are indeed opinions which can arguably be called apologetic towards Russia. However, those holding such opinions are but a minority and are hardly able to alter the position of the government or the Japanese public as a whole. There is a virtual consensus about the issue, and nuances in the positions of major political forces are inconsequential. One would be justified to assume that, under any probable domestic political situation, Tokyo will not change its policy about the matter.
In the second half of 2022, the Japanese political world was shaken by a major scandal: in July 2022, former Prime Minister and a prominent member of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party Abe Shinzō was killed at an election rally. The assassin, caught at the crime scene, declared that the murder was a revenge for the victim’s connection with the Unification Church, which, according to the perpetrator’s words, had led his family to financial ruin. Initially, this explanation seemed fantastical, but the investigation that followed revealed that both Abe Shinzō himself and many other Japanese politicians had been maintaining connections with the Unification Church for many years. This caused an uproar in Japanese society, especially given the rather controversial reputation of the Unification Church. On January 26, 2023, the Association of Japanologists and the research laboratory “Center for Japanese, Korean, and Mongolian Studies” of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University) held a roundtable “Unification Church in Japan as a Sociocultural and Political Phenomenon”. The participants of the roundtable analyzed the situation around the Unification Church and its role in Japanese politics in detail, studied the specific features of the “new religions” in Japanese society, and considered the factors determining their influence on the political world of Japan.
The “Nixon China Shock” (the July 15, 1971 statement by the U.S. President R. Nixon about the recent trip of his National Security Advisor H. Kissinger to the PRC and about the President’s upcoming visit there) became one of the pivotal points in the history of Japanese foreign policy and contributed to Tokyo becoming more independent from Washington in its diplomatic course. Using the case of Japan’s reaction to this event, the article explores the characteristic features of the foreign policy making process in post-war Japan and demonstrates the considerable influence of these features on the character of Japanese foreign policy of the so-called “1955 System” period (the prolonged and continuous dominance of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party in 1955-93). The paper shows the decentralization of the foreign policy making process, expressed in the limited ability of the Prime Minister to determine foreign policy, the presence of considerable internal contradictions in the MoFA of Japan, the factionalism of the ruling party, and the high degree of dependency of the government’s policy course on the public opinion. It proves that these factors were one of the reasons for Japan’s political leadership avoiding decisive actions to normalize relations with the PRC before the “Nixon shock”, cautious that it might damage its relations with the U.S. and unable to discern the signs of upcoming U.S.-Chinese détente, and after this event, vice versa, making every effort to normalize its relations with Beijing as soon as possible, reaching this goal even before their American partners did. Given the historical importance of the “1955 System” for contemporary Japanese politics, the article’s conclusions are significant for the understanding of the logic of Japan’s domestic politics and foreign policy of the entire post-war period.Author declares the absence of conflict of interests.
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