Despite a robust history of studies examining legislative outputs, little is known about how divided government affects the policymaking process. This article examines these dynamics by analyzing the relationship between divided government and delay in the consideration of important legislation. We also introduce a more nuanced measure of divided government-the strength of the president's party in Congress-that measures both the presence and magnitude of inter-branch conflict. Using a Cox proportional hazards model to analyze delay of important legislation from 1949 to 2010, the results indicate both divided government and the strength of the president's party in Congress are significantly related to legislative delay. Moreover, presidential party strength significantly interacts with partisan polarization. When the parties are moderately or highly polarized, there is a significant relationship between the strength of the president's party and legislative delay; this relationship is insignificant at lower levels of polarization. Taken together, these findings enhance our understanding of how inter-branch conflict affects the policymaking process in Congress.

Objective We examine President Obama's use of international agreements as he pursued his foreign policy agenda during his first three years in office. While President Obama uses executive agreements at similar levels as previous presidents, he has used the treaty mechanism far less often. This presents an interesting puzzle: Why has Obama used so few treaties when his own party controls the Senate? Methods We address this puzzle by analyzing Obama alongside other presidents in analyses of treaty use and in presidents’ experience with treaty delay employing ordinary least squares (OLS) and maximum likelihood estimation regression techniques. We also utilize the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and Obama's use of treaty priority lists as qualitative case studies. Results The various findings together suggest that the rise of partisan polarization, including conservatives’ propensity to oppose significant treaties, factors into Obama's decisions to use treaties when completing major diplomacy. Conclusions The partisan context of the Senate provides a substantial constraint on presidents looking to cement important new foreign policies through international agreements.

The majority party dominates legislative outputs and throughputs in rule-driven institutions, but these agenda-setting powers may not extend to other facets of the policy process. This article assesses the minority party's ability to influence majority party issue attention in the US House of Representatives by analyzing one-minute speeches given on the House floor. This new measure of partisan issue attention highlights how the parties focus on the same policy issues in the same relative proportions, rather than crafting divergent issue agendas. Time series analysis indicates gaps between the parties' level of attention to particular issues result in corresponding changes to majority party attention, which suggests the minority party can influence majority party issue attention by placing more emphasis on specific policy issues.

The flow of attention in the policy process is dynamic and disruptive. While we know changes in issue attention often result in policy change, the causal mechanisms underlying the different stages of the attention allocation process remain unclear. This article uses Punctuated Equilibrium Theory to examine an underdeveloped aspect of issue attention within policy-making institutions: how specific policy indicators influence the entry and exit of issues on policy-making agendas. Partisan issue attention in the House of Representatives is used to analyze a significant change to U.S. offshore oil and natural gas drilling policy in 2008. The results highlight how historically high gasoline prices precipitated a shift in attention to offshore drilling and subsequent policy change. Moreover, gasoline prices Granger-cause attention to energy policy in partisan speeches over time. The analysis further reveals how competing policy frames and a salient focusing event shaped congressional and public discourse, leading to subsequent changes in attention. Taken together, the findings broaden our understanding of the policy process by identifying the specific forces behind the entry and exit of issues on the policy-making agenda. Identificando las causas de la atenci on a temas y cambios pol ıticos: evidencia obtenida de la pol ıtica de extracci on de petr oleo y gas natural costa afuera de 2008El flujo de atenci on en el proceso pol ıtico es din amico y disruptivo. A pesar de que sepamos que los cambios en atenci on a los temas resultan a menudo en cambios pol ıticos, los mecanismos causales que est an por debajo de las diferentes etapas del proceso de asignar atenci on permanecen inciertos. Este art ıculo utiliza la teor ıa del equilibrio puntuado para examinar un aspecto subdesarrollado de la atenci on a temas dentro de las instituciones de creaci on de pol ıticas: c omo los indicadores pol ıticos espec ıficos influencian la entrada y salida de problemas en las agendas de creaci on de pol ıticas. La atenci on a problemas partidistas en la C amara de Representantes se usa para analizar un cambio significativo a la pol ıtica de perforaci on costa afuera de petr oleo y gas natural en 2008. Los resultados resaltan c omo los precios hist oricamente altos de la gasolina apresuraron un cambio en atenci on a la bs_bs_banner perforaci on costa afuera y el cambio pol ıtico posterior. Adicionalmente, los precios de la gasolina tienen el efecto causal de Granger en la atenci on a la pol ıtica de energ ıa en discursos partidistas con el tiempo. El an alisis revela adicionalmente c omo los marcos pol ıticos rivales y un enfoque destacado dieron forma al discurso p ublico y del congreso, lo que llev o a cambios subsiguientes en atenci on. En conjunto, los hallazgos ampl ıan nuestro entendimiento del proceso pol ıtico al identificar las fuerzas espec ıficas detr as de la entrada y salida de temas en la agenda de creaci on de pol ıticas.

No abstract