Artificial intelligence has seen several breakthroughs in recent years, with games often serving as milestones. A common feature of these games is that players have perfect information. Poker, the quintessential game of imperfect information, is a long-standing challenge problem in artificial intelligence. We introduce DeepStack, an algorithm for imperfect-information settings. It combines recursive reasoning to handle information asymmetry, decomposition to focus computation on the relevant decision, and a form of intuition that is automatically learned from self-play using deep learning. In a study involving 44,000 hands of poker, DeepStack defeated, with statistical significance, professional poker players in heads-up no-limit Texas hold'em. The approach is theoretically sound and is shown to produce strategies that are more difficult to exploit than prior approaches.
Extensive-form games are a common model for multiagent interactions with imperfect information. In two-player zerosum games, the typical solution concept is a Nash equilibrium over the unconstrained strategy set for each player. In many situations, however, we would like to constrain the set of possible strategies. For example, constraints are a natural way to model limited resources, risk mitigation, safety, consistency with past observations of behavior, or other secondary objectives for an agent. In small games, optimal strategies under linear constraints can be found by solving a linear program; however, state-of-the-art algorithms for solving large games cannot handle general constraints. In this work we introduce a generalized form of Counterfactual Regret Minimization that provably finds optimal strategies under any feasible set of convex constraints. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithm for finding strategies that mitigate risk in security games, and for opponent modeling in poker games when given only partial observations of private information.
Extensive-form games are a powerful tool for representing complex multi-agent interactions. Nash equilibrium strategies are commonly used as a solution concept for extensive-form games, but many games are too large for the computation of Nash equilibria to be tractable. In these large games, exploitability has traditionally been used to measure deviation from Nash equilibrium, and thus strategies are aimed to achieve minimal exploitability. However, while exploitability measures a strategy's worst-case performance, it fails to capture how likely that worst-case is to be observed in practice. In fact, empirical evidence has shown that a less exploitable strategy can perform worse than a more exploitable strategy in one-on-one play against a variety of opponents. In this work, we propose a class of response functions that can be used to measure the strength of a strategy. We prove that standard no-regret algorithms can be used to learn optimal strategies for a scenario where the opponent uses one of these response functions. We demonstrate the effectiveness of this technique in Leduc Hold'em against opponents that use the UCT Monte Carlo tree search algorithm.
We conduct the first large-scale study of image-based political misinformation on Facebook. We collect 13,723,654 posts from 14,532 pages and 11,454 public groups from August through October 2020, posts that together account for nearly all engagement of U.S. public political content on Facebook. We use perceptual hashing to identify duplicate images and computer vision to identify political figures. Twenty-three percent of sampled political images (N = 1,000) contained misinformation, as did 20% of sampled images (N = 1,000) containing political figures. We find enormous partisan asymmetry in misinformation posts, with right-leaning images 5–8 times more likely to be misleading, but little evidence that misleading images generate higher engagement. Previous scholarship, which mostly cataloged links to noncredible domains, has ignored image posts which account for a higher volume of misinformation. This research shows that new computer-assisted methods can scale to millions of images, and help address perennial and long-unanswered calls for more systematic study of visual political communication.
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