Boundedly rational heuristics for inference can be surprisingly accurate and frugal for several reasons. They can exploit environmental structures, co-opt complex capacities, and elude effortful search by exploiting information that automatically arrives on the mental stage. The fluency heuristic is a prime example of a heuristic that makes the most of an automatic by-product of retrieval from memory, namely, retrieval fluency. In 4 experiments, the authors show that retrieval fluency can be a proxy for real-world quantities, that people can discriminate between two objects' retrieval fluencies, and that people's inferences are in line with the fluency heuristic (in particular fast inferences) and with experimentally manipulated fluency. The authors conclude that the fluency heuristic may be one tool in the mind's repertoire of strategies that artfully probes memory for encapsulated frequency information that can veridically reflect statistical regularities in the world.

No abstract

No abstract

This article describes the care processes for a 64-year-old man with newly diagnosed advanced non-small-cell lung cancer who was enrolled in a first-line clinical trial of a new immunotherapy regimen. The case highlights the concept of multiteam systems in cancer clinical research and clinical care. Because clinical research represents a highly dynamic entity-with studies frequently opening, closing, and undergoing modifications-concerted efforts of multiple teams are needed to respond to these changes while continuing to provide consistent, high-level care and timely, accurate clinical data. The case illustrates typical challenges of multiteam care processes. Compared with clinical tasks that are routinely performed by single teams, multiple-team care greatly increases the demands for communication, collaboration, cohesion, and coordination among team members. As the case illustrates, the described research team and clinical team are separated, resulting in suboptimal function. Individual team members interact predominantly with members of their own team. A considerable number of team members lack regular interaction with anyone outside their team. Accompanying this separation, the teams enact rivalries that impede collaboration. The teams have misaligned goals and competing priorities that create competition. Collective identity and cohesion across the two teams are low. Research team and clinical team members have limited knowledge of the roles and work of individuals outside their team. Recommendations to increase trust and collaboration are provided. Clinical providers and researchers may incorporate these themes into development and evaluation of multiteam systems, multidisciplinary teams, and cross-functional teams within their own institutions.

The notion of ecological rationality implies that the accuracy of a decision strategy depends on features of the information environment in which it is tested. We demonstrate that the performance of a group may be strongly affected by the decision strategies used by its individual members and specify how this effect is moderated by environmental features. Specifically, in a set of simulation studies, we systematically compared four decision strategies used by the individual group members: two linear, compensatory decision strategies and two simple, noncompensatory heuristics. Individual decisions were aggregated by using a majority rule. To assess the ecological rationality of the strategies, we varied (a) the distribution of cue validities, (b) the quantity, and (c) the quality of shared information. Group performance strongly depended on the distribution of cue validities. When validities were linearly distributed, groups using a compensatory strategy achieved the highest accuracy. Conversely, when cue validities followed a J-shaped distribution, groups using a simple lexicographic heuristic performed best. While these effects were robust across different quantities of shared information, the quality of shared information exerted stronger effects on group performance. Consequences for prescriptive theories on group decision making are discussed Copyright Springer 2006compensatory and noncompensatory decision strategies, group decision making, group performance, simple heuristics,

Research involving hidden-profile tasks suggests that groups typically fail to detect hidden profiles. In previous studies, group members always considered the alternatives in the choice tasks prior to joining the group and, thus, entered discussions with preformed preferences (predecided groups). We set up a new condition, in which group members received their information regarding the choice alternatives at the beginning of their group session (naïve groups). When information was provided in the form of common rather than in the form of unique cues, naïve groups detected the hidden profile throughout. The results indicate that naïve groups are able to detect hidden profiles.

Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) [Models of ecological rationality: The recognition heuristic. Psychological Review, 109 (1), [75][76][77][78][79][80][81][82][83][84][85][86][87][88][89][90] found evidence for the use of the recognition heuristic. For example, if an individual recognizes only one of two cities, they tend to infer that the recognized city has a larger population. A prediction that follows is that of the less-is-more effect: Recognizing fewer cities leads, under certain conditions, to more accurate inferences than recognizing more cities. We extend the recognition heuristic to group decision-making by developing majority and lexicographic models of how recognition information is used by groups. We formally show when the less-is-more effect is predicted in groups and we present a study where three-member groups performed the population comparison task. Several aspects of our data indicate that members who can use the recognition heuristic are, not in all but in most cases, more influential in the group decision process than members who cannot use the heuristic. We also observed the less-is-more effect and found that models assuming that members who can use the recognition heuristic are more influential better predict when the effect occurs.