No abstract

This report outlines the results of a study of severe road traffic accidents in Norway, triggered by drivers at work. The aim has been to examine whether and to what extent risk factors of these triggering drivers and their vehicles can be traced back to work-related factors. The study is based on data from the Accident Analysis Groups (AAG) of the Norwegian Public Roads Administration (NPRA), reports from The Transport Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN) and interviews with nine experts. The quantitative analysis of AAG data shows that too high speed for the circumstances, failure to use seat belt and insufficient information gathering were the most important risk factors in fatal accidents triggered by drivers at work. The qualitative analysis of reports from AIBN and expert interviews uncovered the following work-related factors considered central for traffic safety: follow up of drivers' speed, driving style and use of seat belt, pay systems, safety culture, risk assessments, procedures/work descriptions and training. The AIBN reports and the interviews indicate that the following framework conditions influence traffic safety: time pressure, competition, type of transport, accident investigations/inspections. The majority of the interviewees held that work-related factors with potential implications for traffic safety are insufficiently monitored in controls and inspections.

The research on organizational accidents shows that both safety culture and complex technology make members of high-risk organizations blind to hazards and signals of danger. I discuss how these forms of ignorance can be reduced by means of cultural redundancy, which I understand as the organizational promotion of several co-existing frames of reference of equal standing. This approach is contrary to the main stream research on safety culture, which promotes the ideal of a 'unitary safety culture'. Previous research shows that organizational learning occur trough comparison of perspectives and reflection upon practice. I argue that cultural redundancy is a precondition for processes of learning and culture change that may reduce ignorance to hazards and signals of danger in high-risk organizations. Such processes are, however, contingent on a climate of trust and openness in which co-existing safety cultures can meet and set forth processes of organizational learning.

No abstract

While Norway had the lowest road mortality rate in Europe in 2017, Greece had one of the worst road safety records of all EU-27 countries. The present study investigates road safety culture (RSC) as an explanation for this discrepancy by: (1) Comparing the road safety behaviours among professional and private drivers in Norway and Greece, (2) Examining factors influencing road safety behaviours, focusing especially on national road safety culture, and (3) Examining the influence of road safety behaviours and other factors (e.g., demographic and work-related variables) on accident involvement. This is done by comparing survey answers of private car (N = 796) and professional drivers (heavy goods vehicles and buses) in Norway and Greece (N = 416). Results from qualitative interviews (N = 61) are also presented. We study safety behaviours hypothesized to vary according to nationality (e.g., aggressive violations), and behaviours hypothesized to vary according to the professional versus private driver dimension (e.g., seat belt use). A central objective is to examine whether the former safety behaviours are more similar among private and professional drivers within countries than among professional and private drivers across national samples, indicating common national road safety cultures among private and professional drivers in the respective countries. The results indicate that aggressive violations are more similar among private and professional drivers within the national samples, than across the national samples, while seat belt use seems to vary according to the professional versus private dimension. The results also indicate a relationship between aggressive violations and accident involvement, although other variables were more strongly correlated. Moreover, drivers’ safety behaviours were influenced by the behaviours that these groups ascribed to other drivers in their countries, indicating the existence of different national road safety cultures. The Greek RSC was characterized by more aggression and violations than the Norwegian RSC, which seemed to be characterized by a higher level of compliance and politeness. The different RSCs may perhaps shed light on the different accident records in the two countries.