This paper presents evidence on intra-household retirement externalities by assessing the causal effect of spousal retirement on various health behaviors and health status across 19 European countries. We identify partner's and own retirement effects by applying a fuzzy regression discontinuity design using retirement eligibility as exogenous instruments for spousal and own retirement status. We find significant increases in the frequency and intensity of alcohol consumption combined with a significant decrease in moderate physical activities as a response to partner's retirement. In line with the existing literature, we find that own retirement has significant positive effects on engaging in moderate and vigorous physical activities but also leads to a significant increase in the frequency of alcohol intake. Overall, subjective health is negatively affected by spousal retirement and positively by own retirement.

One of the most salient features of developing economies is the existence of a large informal sector. In this paper, we use quantitative theory to study the dynamic implications of informality on wage inequality, human capital accumulation, child labor, and long-run growth. Our model can generate transitory informality equilibria or informality-induced poverty traps. Its calibration reveals that the case for the poverty-trap hypothesis arises: although informality serves to protect low-skilled workers from extreme poverty in the short run, it prevents income convergence between developed and developing nations in the long run. Then we examine the effectiveness of different development policies to exit the poverty trap. Our numerical experiments show that using means-tested education subsidies is the most costeffective single policy option. However, for longer time horizons, or as the economy gets closer to the poverty trap threshold, combining means-tested education and wage subsidies is even more effective.

In this paper, we analyze the determination of immigration policy in a direct democracy setting. We formulate a model of voting and participation behavior integrating instrumental and expressive motivations. The model is estimated using data drawn from a survey carried out after a vote in Switzer- JEL codes: F22, D72, J61.

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The paper uses a two-sector efficiency-wage model to analyze the consequences of immigration for a small open economy with a dual labor market. Immigrants are characterized by an (exogenous) return probability. Legal regulations impose preferential hiring of natives or "old" immigrants. As a result, there is sectoral segregation between natives and immigrants, leading to discrimination of the type "equal pay for equal work, but unequal work." In the short run (with sector-specific capital), immigration has a positive first-order impact on natives' welfare if migration policy favors segregation through high return rates or restrictive hiring practices ("guest-worker" system). In the long run, its effect is only determined by factor intensities (2 ¥ 2 model). Finally, the improved integration of migrants yields efficiency gains and improves aggregate welfare of all residents.