This report explores the use of environmentally acceptable lubricants (EALs) for U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) dams. This report also identifies above-water and in-water structures where these lubricants would be useful.
Hydrogen sulfide releases occurred during a routine maintenance process in a hydraulic oil system at Blue River Dam, Oregon. The project worked under the hypothesis that the sulfide emissions most likely resulted from reductive biological processes. Hydraulic oil samples were collected from the Blue River Dam, and from two other nearby dams with similar hydraulic systems, Hills Creek Dam, and Cougar Dam. Water samples from the reservoir were also collected. Sulfur was found in all the oil and water samples, however, no patterns with sulfur to other parameters (such as percent water or acid neutralization number) were found in the oil samples. A microscopic review of hydraulic filters did not show any evidence of biofilm accumulation. The use of sulfate reductive bacterial genetic probes did not find any microbial activity expected to form sulfide. These results rejected the hypothesis that the sulfide production was from microbial activity. The Authors now hypothesize that the sulfide reaction was from abiotic reactions of an additive, Zinc Dialkyldithiophosphate (ZDDP). DISCLAIMER:The contents of this report are not to be used for advertising, publication, or promotional purposes. Citation of trade names does not constitute an official endorsement or approval of the use of such commercial products. All product names and trademarks cited are the property of their respective owners. The findings of this report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army position unless so designated by other authorized documents. DESTROY THIS REPORT WHEN NO LONGER NEEDED. DO NOT RETURN IT TO THE ORIGINATOR.
While the prior objective of hydraulic structures is to remain in service, engineers must also be capable to adequately handle their failures. This paper gives guidance on this issue based on the European (mainly Dutch) and American practice. The discussion begins with terminology agreements on “accident” and “calamity”, followed by the notes on risk analysis and life safety risks in particular. Identifying and reducing such risks is an issue of much broader scope than structural analysis. Once an accident happens, proper investigations, handling the losses and planning the repair become major goals. The paper discusses the choice between repair and replacement of a gate, illustrated by examples from the USA and the Netherlands The discussion has an engineering rather than statistical character. The authors believe that accidents are events of infrequent nature and very diverse consequences, difficult to capture in databases.
<p>Hydraulic closures in dams, navigation locks and flood barriers belong to the most heavily loaded structures built by people. While ensuring their sufficient strength is the main engineers’ concern, one must also be prepared to adequately handle their failures. Identifying and reducing the risks of failures is an issue of wider scope than structural analysis alone. Once an accident happens, proper investigations, handling the losses and planning the repair become primary goals. This paper gives a general guidance on these issues reflecting the European (mainly Dutch) and American practice. The discussion includes both handling the situations immediately after the accidents, and the choice between repair and replacement of a damaged structure. Accidents are infrequent events of very diverse causes and consequences, therefore this discussion has an engineering rather than statistical character.</p><p>Both authors contributed to resolving accidents and failures of hydraulic structures, in the roles varying from investigation or design leader to repair manager. They were also consulted or made part of crisis teams in a number of other so-called “upset events”. This paper combines the highlights of their own experience and the practices being followed by the waterway administrations in the USA and the Netherlands. The selected examples are also from these countries, but can be seen as reflecting issues and concerns anywhere.</p>
While the prior objective of hydraulic structures (such as lock gates, navigation river weirs and storm surge barriers) is to remain in service, engineers must also be capable to adequately handle their failures. Despite the ongoing development of expertise, design tools, norms, and construction methods, there are still a considerable number of accidents and calamities that happen to such structures. In addition, the losses and costs of damages as result of these so-called “upset events” are growing due to the growing complexity of waterborne infrastructure, intensity of navigation or other utilization of inland waters.Accidents to hydraulic structures happen not only when their loads exceed the design strength. Other possible causes are, for example, unforeseen conditions, lack of inspection and maintenance, improper operation, and navigation errors. These other causes of accidents are often less controlled by technical norms than the relations between loads and resistances of structures. In addition, there are often combinations and complex sequences of events that may lead to disastrous results.So far, various PIANC Working Groups have provided guidance for preventing accidents from happening, e.g. PIANC (2019) and PIANC (2020), including the accidents resulting from ship collision, e.g. PIANC (2014) and PIANC (2018). While this should remain the engineer’s main concern, there is also a demand for more guidance how to effectively handle the accidents and calamities that actually happen. This is a matter of combined effort of not only engineers. Nevertheless, engineers can and should contribute to the solutions in such cases. Therefore, a new PIANC InCom Working Group has been established to investigate the existing practices in handling accidents and calamities; and to provide guidance in this field for professionals involved. This paper presents the objectives of the Working Group, selected investigation approach, some preliminary investigation results, and the envisioned contents of the final report.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.