A negotiation between agents is typically an incomplete information game, where the agents initially do not know their opponent's preferences or strategy. This poses a challenge, as efficient and effective negotiation requires the bidding agent to take the other's wishes and future behavior into account when deciding on a proposal. Therefore, in order to reach better and earlier agreements, an agent can apply learning techniques to construct a model of the opponent. There is a mature body of research in negotiation that focuses on modeling the opponent, but there exists no recent survey of commonly used opponent modeling techniques. This work aims to advance and integrate knowledge of the field by providing a comprehensive survey of currently existing opponent models in a bilateral negotiation setting. We discuss all possible ways opponent modeling has been used to benefit agents so far, and we introduce a taxonomy of currently existing opponent models based on their underlying learning techniques. We also present techniques to measure the success of opponent models and provide guidelines for deciding on the appropriate performance measures for every opponent model type in our taxonomy.
The design of automated negotiators has been the focus of abundant research in recent years. However, due to difficulties involved in creating generalized agents that can negotiate in several domains and against human counterparts, many automated negotiators are domain specific and their behavior cannot be generalized for other domains. Some of these difficulties arise from the differences inherent within the domains, the need to understand and learn negotiators' diverse preferences concerning issues of the domain and the different strategies negotiators can undertake. In this paper we present a system that enables alleviation of the difficulties in the design process of general automated negotiators termed GENIUS, a General Environment for Negotiation with Intelligent multipurpose Usage Simulation. With the constant introduction of new domains, e-commerce and other applications, which require automated negotiations, generic automated negotiators encompass many benefits and advantages over agents that are designed for a specific domain. Based on experiments conducted with automated agents designed by human subjects using GENIUS we provide both quantitative and qualitative results to illustrate its efficacy. Finally, we also analyze a recent automated bilateral negotiators competition that was based on GENIUS. Our results show the advantages and underlying benefits of using GENIUS and how it can facilitate the design of general automated negotiators.
Motivated by the challenges of bilateral negotiations between people and automated agents we organized the first automated negotiating agents competition (ANAC 2010). The purpose of the competition is to facilitate the research in the area bilateral multi-issue closed negotiation. The competition was based on the Genius environment, which is a General Environment for Negotiation with Intelligent multi-purpose Usage Simulation. The first competition was held in conjunction with the Ninth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-10) and was comprised of seven teams. This paper presents an overview of the competition, as well as general and contrasting approaches towards negotiation strategies that were adopted by the participants of the competition. Based on analysis in post-tournament experiments, the paper also attempts to provide some insights with regard to effective approaches towards the design of negotiation strategies.
This paper presents an automated peer-to-peer negotiation strategy for settling energy contracts among prosumers in a Residential Energy Cooperative considering heterogeneity prosumer preferences. The heterogeneity arises from prosumers' evaluation of energy contracts through multiple societal and environmental criteria and the prosumers' private preferences over those criteria. The prosumers engage in bilateral negotiations with peers to mutually agree on periodical energy contracts/loans consisting of the energy volume to be exchanged at that period and the return time of the exchanged energy. The negotiating prosumers navigate through a common negotiation domain consisting of potential energy contracts and evaluate those contracts from their valuations on the entailed criteria against a utility function that is robust against generation and demand uncertainty. From the repeated interactions, a prosumer gradually learns about the compatibility of its peers in reaching energy contracts that are closer to Nash solutions. Empirical evaluation on real demand, generation and storage profiles -in multiple system scales -illustrates that the proposed negotiation based strategy can increase the system efficiency (measured by utilitarian social welfare) and fairness (measured by Nash social welfare) over a baseline strategy and an individual flexibility control strategy representing the status quo strategy. We thus elicit system benefits from peer-to-peer flexibility exchange already without any central coordination and market operator, providing a simple yet flexible and effective paradigm that complements existing markets.
Abstract-When two agents settle a mutual concern by negotiating with each other, they usually do not share their preferences so as to avoid exploitation. In such a setting, the agents may need to analyze each other's behavior to make an estimation of the opponent's preferences. This process of opponent modeling makes it possible to find a satisfying negotiation outcome for both parties. A large number of such opponent modeling techniques have already been introduced, together with different measures to assess their quality. The quality of an opponent model can be measured in two different ways: one is to use the agent's performance as a benchmark for the model's quality, the other is to directly evaluate its accuracy by using similarity measures. Both methods have been used extensively, and both have their distinct advantages and drawbacks. In this work we investigate the exact relation between the two, and we pinpoint the measures for accuracy that best predict performance gain. This leads us to new insights in how to construct an opponent model, and what we need to measure when optimizing performance.
The Internet of Things is expected to generate large amounts of heterogeneous data from diverse sources including physical sensors, user devices and social media platforms. Over the last few years, significant attention has been focused on personal
Computers that negotiate on our behalf hold great promise for the future and will even become indispensable in emerging application domains such as the smart grid and the Internet of Things. Much research has thus been expended to create agents that are able to negotiate in an abundance of circumstances. However, up until now, truly autonomous negotiators have rarely been deployed in real-world applications. This paper sizes up current negotiating agents and explores a number of technological, societal and ethical challenges that autonomous negotiation systems have brought about. The questions we address are: in what sense are these systems autonomous, what has been holding back their further proliferation, and is their spread something we should encourage? We relate the automated negotiation research agenda to dimensions of autonomy and distill three major themes that we believe will propel autonomous negotiation forward: accurate representation, long-term perspective, and user trust. We argue these orthogonal research directions need to be aligned and advanced in unison to sustain tangible progress in the field.
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