The 2012 Brazilian Forest Code governs the fate of forests and savannas on Brazil's 394 Mha of privately owned lands. The government claims that a new national land registry (SICAR), introduced under the revised law, could end illegal deforestation by greatly reducing the cost of monitoring, enforcement, and compliance. This study evaluates that potential, using data from state-level land registries (CAR) in Pará and Mato Grosso that were precursors of SICAR. Using geospatial analyses and stakeholder interviews, we quantify the impact of CAR on deforestation and forest restoration, investigating how landowners adjust their behaviors over time. Our results indicate rapid adoption of CAR, with registered properties covering a total of 57 Mha by 2013. This suggests that the financial incentives to join CAR currently exceed the costs. Registered properties initially showed lower deforestation rates than unregistered ones, but these differences varied by property size and diminished over time. Moreover, only 6% of registered producers reported taking steps to restore illegally cleared areas on their properties. Our results suggest that, from the landowner's perspective, full compliance with the Forest Code offers few economic benefits. Achieving zero illegal deforestation in this context would require the private sector to include full compliance as a market criterion, while state and federal governments develop SICAR as a de facto enforcement mechanism. These results are relevant to other tropical countries and underscore the importance of developing a policy mix that creates lasting incentives for sustainable land-use practices.deforestation | Forest Code | tropical forests | governance | Amazon

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This article documents the degree of noncompliance of soy producers in the Amazon portion of Mato Grosso with Brazil's Forest Code and addresses the importance of market demands in shifting agricultural production and land occupation towards zero deforestation. By using a sample composed of the boundaries of 9,113 properties (72.5% of soy in the region) we assessed: a) compliance with Forest Code legal reserve requirements (a percentage of the property must have its original vegetation kept undisturbed); and compared it to b) compliance with the zero deforestation criterion of the soy moratorium. We found that 82% of the sampled properties have not deforested since 2008, thus complying with the soy moratorium. However, approximately 65% out of these 82% are noncompliant with Forest Code legal reserve requirements. This situation is even worse in the Cerrado portion of Mato Grosso. Even though the soy moratorium criterion is only applicable to the Amazon biome, the Forest Code is applicable nationwide. Despite legal reserve requirements being much lower (35% of the property in the Cerrado, as opposed to 80% in the Amazon), almost 70% of sampled properties were noncompliant with the Forest Code. From this analysis we concluded that while there was a role for consumer-driven market demand for zero deforestation soy production, there is still a need (and opportunity) to implement purchasing and financing criteria to promote compliance with Forest Code requirements in regards to legal reserve deficits. We believe that if this succeeds, it will drive a process of restoration and compensation of Forest Code deficits, strengthening public policy as well as reducing economic distortions between those who have and have not complied with Forest Code requirements.

Rainforest gives way to pastures in the Brazilian Amazon in Mato Grosso. LETTERS with Brazil conditional on: (i) upholding the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; (ii) improving procedures to trace commodities associated with deforestation and Indigenous rights conflicts; and (iii) consulting with, and gaining consent from, Indigenous Peoples and local communities to define strict social and environmental criteria for traded commodities. The EU was founded on the principles of respecting human rights and human dignity. Today, it has the opportunity to be a global leader in supporting these principles and a habitable climate by making sustainability the cornerstone of its trade negotiations with Brazil.

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Many companies sourcing agricultural commodities with high deforestation risk have committed to zero deforestation, meaning they intend to eliminate deforestation from their supply chains. While previous research has attempted to assess progress against such initiatives, little is known about how the characteristics of sourcing patterns may influence the adoption and potential effectiveness of zero-deforestation commitments. Supply chain stickinesshere defined as the geographic persistence in trade relationships between traders and sourcing regions over timemay reflect lock-in effects and the level of trust between the parties involved. Here, we use a metric of supply chain stickiness, calculated from temporal network analyses on the Brazilian soy export supply chain, as a proxy for these underlying dynamics to explore their effect on the adoption and effectiveness of zero deforestation commitments (ZDCs). Using data for 2004-2017, we find that although stickier traders are more likely to adopt ZDCs, they also appear to have less effective ZDCs than other traders (as indicated by the level of soy and territorial deforestation in their sourcing regions). This finding suggests that additional strategies are needed to increase the effectiveness of ZDCs.