Within an embodied cognition framework, it is argued that presence in a virtual environment (VE) develops from the construction of a spatial-functional mental model of the VE. Two cognitive processes lead to this model: the representation of bodily actions as possible actions in the VE, and the suppression of incompatible sensory input. It is hypothesized that the conscious sense of presence reflects these two components as spatial presence and involvement. This prediction was confirmed in two studies (N = 246 and N = 296) assessing self-reports of presence and immersion experiences. Additionally, judgments of “realness” were observed as a third presence component. A second-order factor analysis showed a distinction between presence, immersion, and interaction factors. Building on these results, a thirteen-item presence scale consisting of three independent components was developed and verified using confirmatory factor analyses across the two studies.

Metaphorically, power equals up. Drawing on embodied theories of cognition, the author argues that thinking about power involves mental simulation of space and can be interfered with by perception of vertical differences. Study 1 assessed image schemas for power and found a shared vertical difference metaphor. Studies 2, 3, and 4 showed that the judgment of a group's power is influenced by the group's vertical position in space and motor responses implying vertical movement. Study 5 ruled out that the influence of vertical position on power judgments is driven by valence differences. Study 6 showed that vertical position also influences the power judgment result itself. The evidence suggests that the concept of power is partly represented in perceptual form as vertical difference.

Four studies show that the abstract concept of importance is grounded in bodily experiences of weight. Participants provided judgments of importance while they held either a heavy or a light clipboard. Holding a heavy clipboard increased judgments of monetary value (Study 1) and made participants consider fair decision-making procedures to be more important (Study 2). It also caused more elaborate thinking, as indicated by higher consistency between related judgments (Study 3) and by greater polarization of agreement ratings for strong versus weak arguments (Study 4). In line with an embodied perspective on cognition, these findings suggest that, much as weight makes people invest more physical effort in dealing with concrete objects, it also makes people invest more cognitive effort in dealing with abstract issues.

For describing our relation to a group, we often use the language of spatial metaphors: We enter or leave a group; we distance ourselves from a group or are in the inner circle. Finally, we can be simply in a group, which then becomes an ingroup: The interrelational constructs (Higgins & Chaires, 1980) in and out denoting ingroup and outgroup are spatial metaphors. In many cases, this language ®ts the actual behavior in the social environment, where attitudes between social groups are expressed in spatial arrangements (Campbell, Kruskal, & Wallace, 1966). However, social psychological concepts for one's relation to a group, such as identi®cation and self-categorization, in general ignore the spatial dimension. The present research shows that one's relation to a group and the perception of the intergroup context can be assessed with graphical measures that depict spatial relations. We will ®rst review previous approaches in this direction, and then propose a new scale. Convergent and discriminant validity of the scale is demonstrated in four validation studies and one experimental study.

In a study that builds on recent cognitive neuroscience research on body perception and social psychology research on social relations, we tested the hypothesis that synchronous multisensory stimulation leads to self-other merging. We brushed the cheek of each study participant as he or she watched a stranger's cheek being brushed in the same way, either in synchrony or in asynchrony. We found that this multisensory procedure had an effect on participants' body perception as well as social perception. Study participants exposed to synchronous stimulation showed more merging of self and the other than participants exposed to asynchronous stimulation. The degree of self-other merging was determined by measuring participants' body sensations and their perception of face resemblance, as well as participants' judgment of the inner state of the other, closeness felt toward the other, and conformity behavior. The results of this study show how multisensory integration can affect social perception and create a sense of self-other similarity.