In most activity-based financing systems, payers set prices reactively based on historical averages of hospital reported costs. If hospitals respond to prices, payers might set prices proactively to affect the volume of particular treatments or clinical practice. We evaluate the effects of a unique initiative in England in which the price offered to hospitals for discharging patients on the same day as a particular procedure was increased by 24%, while the price for inpatient treatment remained unchanged. Using national hospital records for 205,784 patients admitted for the incentivised procedure and 838,369 patients admitted for a range of non-incentivised procedures between 1 December 2007 and 31 March 2011, we consider whether this price change had the intended effect and/or produced unintended effects. We find that the price change led to an almost six percentage point increase in the daycase rate and an 11 percentage point increase in the planned daycase rate. Patients benefited from a lower proportion of procedures reverted to open surgery during a planned laparoscopic procedure and from a reduction in long stays. There was no evidence that readmission and death rates were affected. The results suggest that payers can set prices proactively to incentivise hospitals to improve quality.
There is concern that pay-for-performance (P4P) can negatively affect general practitioners (GPs) by reducing their autonomy, increasing their wage dispersion or eroding their intrinsic motivation. This is especially a concern for the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF), a highly powered P4P scheme for UK GPs. The QOF affected all GPs but the exposure of their income to P4P varied. GPs did not know their level of exposure before the QOF was introduced and could not choose or manage it. We examine whether changes in GPs' job satisfaction before and after the introduction of the QOF in 2004 were correlated with the proportion of their income that became exposed to P4P. We use data on 1920 GPs observed at three time points spanning the introduction of the QOF; 2004, 2005 and 2008. We estimate the effect of exposure to P4P using a continuous difference-in-differences model. We find no significant effects of P4P exposure on overall job satisfaction or 12 additional measures of working lives in either the short or longer term. The level of exposure to P4P does not harm job satisfaction or other aspects of working lives. Policies influencing the exposure of income to P4P are unlikely to alter GP job satisfaction subject to final income remaining constant.
IntroductionHospital inspection and the publication of inspection ratings are widely used regulatory interventions that may improve hospital performance by providing feedback, creating incentives to change and promoting choice. However, evidence that these interventions assess performance accurately and lead to improved performance is scarce.MethodsWe calculated six standard indicators of emergency department (ED) performance for 118 hospitals in England whose EDs were inspected by the Care Quality Commission, the national regulator in England, between 2013 and 2016. We linked these to inspection dates and subsequent rating scores. We used multilevel linear regression models to estimate the relationship between prior performance and subsequent rating score and the relationship between rating score and post-inspection performance.ResultsWe found no relationship between performance on any of the six indicators prior to inspection and the subsequent rating score. There was no change in performance on any of the six indicators following inspection for any rating score. In each model, CIs were wide indicating no statistically significant relationships.DiscussionWe found no association between established performance indicators and rating scores. This might be because the inspection and rating process adds little to the external performance management that EDs receive. It could also indicate the limited ability of hospitals to improve ED performance because of extrinsic factors that are beyond their control.
Background Many physicians are experiencing increasing demands from both their patients and society. Evidence is scarce on the consequences of the pressure on physicians’ decision making. We present a theoretical framework and predict that increasing pressure may make physicians disregard societal welfare when treating patients. Setting We test our prediction on general practitioners’ antibiotic-prescribing choices. Because prescribing broad-spectrum antibiotics does not require microbiological testing, it can be performed more quickly than prescribing for narrow-spectrum antibiotics and is therefore often preferred by the patient. In contrast, from a societal perspective, inappropriate prescribing of broad-spectrum antibiotics should be minimized as it may contribute to antimicrobial resistance in the general population. Methods We combine longitudinal survey data and administrative data from 2010 to 2017 to create a balanced panel of up to 1072 English general practitioners (GPs). Using a series of linear models with GP fixed effects, we estimate the importance of different sources of pressure for GPs’ prescribing. Results We find that the percentage of broad-spectrum antibiotics prescribed increases by 6.4% as pressure increases on English GPs. The link between pressure and prescribing holds for different sources of pressure. Conclusions Our findings suggest that there may be societal costs of physicians working under pressure. Policy makers need to take these costs into account when evaluating existing policies as well as when introducing new policies affecting physicians’ work pressure. An important avenue for further research is also to determine the underlying mechanisms related to the different sources of pressure.JEL-code: I11, J28, J45 Highlights Many physicians are working under increasing pressure. We test the importance of pressure on physicians’ prescribing of antibiotics. The prescribed rate of broad-spectrum antibiotics increases with pressure. Policy makers should be aware of the societal costs of pressured physicians. [Formula: see text]
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