We report H5N1 virus infection in a domestic cat infected by eating a pigeon carcass. The virus isolated from the pigeon and the cat showed the same cluster as the viruses obtained during the outbreak in Thailand. Since cats are common house pets, concern regarding disease transmission to humans exists.

Early detection and control curtail outbreaks.

During the second outbreak of avian influenza H5N1 in Thailand, probable horizontal transmission among tigers was demonstrated in the tiger zoo. Sequencing and phylogenetic analysis of those viruses showed no differences from the first isolate obtained in January 2004. This finding has implications for influenza virus epidemiology and pathogenicity in mammals.

Avian influenza H5N1 virus is known to cross the species barrier and infect humans and felines. We report a fatal H5N1 infection in a dog following ingestion of an H5N1-infected duck during an outbreak in Thailand in 2004. With new reports of H5N1 virus continuing across Asia, Europe, and Africa, this finding highlights the need for monitoring of domestic animals during outbreaks.

Traditional methods of raising ducks in Southeast Asia must be modified.

This present study is the first to quantify the transmission of avian influenza virus H5N1 within flocks during the 2004 epidemic in Thailand. It uses the flock-level mortality data to estimate the transmission-rate parameter ( beta ) and the basic reproduction number (R(0)). The point estimates of beta varied from 2.26/day (95% confidence interval [CI], 2.01-2.55) for a 1-day infectious period to 0.66/day (95% CI, 0.50-0.87) for a 4-day infectious period, whereas the accompanying R(0) varied from 2.26 (95% CI, 2.01-2.55) to 2.64 (95% CI, 2.02-3.47). Although the point estimates of beta of backyard chickens and fighting cocks raised together were lower than those of laying hens and broiler chickens, this difference was not statistically significant. These results will enable us to assess the control measures in simulation studies. They also indicate that, for the elimination of the virus, a critical proportion of the susceptible poultry population in a flock (i.e., 80% of the population) needs to be vaccinated.

This study was conducted to investigate space and time clusters of highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) virus infection and to determine risk factors at the subdistrict level in Thailand. Highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) was diagnosed in 1890 poultry flocks located in 953 subdistricts during 2004-2007. The ecologic risk for H5N1 virus infection was assessed on the basis of a spatial-based case-control study involving 824 case subdistricts and 3296 control subdistricts from 6 study periods. Risk factors investigated in clustered areas of H5N1 included human and animal demographic characteristics, poultry production systems, and wild birds and their habitats. Six variables remained statistically significant in the final model: flock density of backyard chickens (odds ratio [OR], 0.98), flock density of fighting cocks (OR, 1.02), low and high human density (OR, 0.60), presence of quail flocks (OR, 1.21), free-grazing duck flocks (OR, 2.17), and a poultry slaughterhouse (OR, 1.33). We observed a strong association between subdistricts with H5N1 virus-infected poultry flocks and evidence of prior and concomitant H5N1 infection in wild birds in the same subdistrict.

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