Abstract. Using Monte Carlo simulations, we study the evolution of contigent cooperation and ethnocentrism in the one-move game. Interactions and reproduction among computational agents are simulated on undirected and directed Barabási-Albert (BA) networks. We first replicate the Hammond-Axelrod model of ingroup favoritism on a square lattice and then generalize this model on undirected and directed BA networks for both asexual and sexual reproduction cases. Our simulations demonstrate that irrespective of the mode of reproduction, ethnocentric strategy becomes common even though cooperation is individually costly and mechanisms such as reciprocity or conformity are absent. Moreover, our results indicate that the spread of favoritism toward similar others highly depends on the network topology and the associated heterogeneity of the studied population.

The standard three-state voter model is enlarged by including the outside pressure favouring one of the three choices and by adding some biased internal random noise. The Monte Carlo simulations are motivated by states with the population divided into three groups of various affinities to each other. We show the crucial influence of the boundaries for moderate lattice sizes like 500 × 500. By removing the fixed boundary at one side, we demonstrate that this can lead to the victory of one single choice. Noise in contrast stabilizes the choices of all three populations. In addition, we compute the persistence probability, i.e., the number of sites who have never changed their opinion during the simulation, and we consider the case of "rigid-minded" decision makers.

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