Using an international sample of corporate Green bond issuances over the recent period, this paper highlights the potential consequences of the issuance of a Green bond on the issuer’s financial performance. Starting with a first sample of 2079 Green bond issuances of 190 unique issuers from 2009 to 2018, we investigate only corporate green bond issuances. Our final sample contains 475 green bonds issued by 145 unique firms. We find that the market reacts negatively to the announcement of green bond issuances. In particular, results show that the stock market reacts on the day of the green bond announcement date and the day after, and that the cumulative abnormal return is between −0.5% and −0.2%, depending on the asset pricing model (CAPM, the 3-factor Fama and French models, and the 4-factor Carhart models). This effect is mainly noticeable at the first Green Bond issuance and in developed markets. Our results provide evidence that the investors react in the same manner for Green bonds as for conventional or convertible bonds. This evidence suggests that green debt offerings convey unfavorable information about the issuing firms.
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of the control-ownership wedge of controlling shareholders (excess control) on the survival of French initial public offerings (IPOs).
Design/methodology/approach
This paper studies a large sample of 434 French IPOs. The empirical analysis uses the Cox proportional hazard and accelerated-failure-time models. Data are manually gathered from IPO prospectuses.
Findings
The findings support a positive relation between the control-ownership wedge and IPO survival time, indicating that survival is more likely in firms with high excess control levels. This result is consistent with the view that controlling shareholders with a large control-ownership wedge have incentives to preserve their private benefits of control by increasing firm survival chances. The findings also show that older IPOs are more likely to survive, while riskier and underpriced IPOs are more likely to delist.
Practical implications
The results provide a better understanding of the role of excess control in IPO survival. They also enrich the debate on the efficiency of the one-share-one-vote rule.
Originality/value
The research provides new insights into the role of agency conflicts in IPO survivability. In particular, it explores the effect of dominant shareholders with a control-ownership wedge on survival time.
This study examines the link between product market competition and labour investment efficiency. We find that competitive pressure distorts the efficiency of corporate employment decisions by creating an underinvestment problem. This finding withstands a battery of robustness checks and remains unchanged after accounting for endogeneity concerns. Additional analysis shows that the relationship between product market competition and labour investment efficiency is stronger for firms facing higher competitive threats, greater financial constraints, higher information asymmetry and higher labour adjustment costs. Our results suggest that as competition increases bankruptcy risk, it leads managers to underinvest in labour to avoid incurring labour‐related costs.
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