In this paper, we propose a formal model of coordinated attacks in which several attackers cooperate towards a common malicious goal. The model investigates both attack planning and vulnerability analysis, thereby providing a uniform approach to system and adversary modelling. In addition, the model is general enough to explain both coordinated and single attacks.In the paper, we define the notion of coordinated-attack graph, propose an algorithm for efficient generation of coordinated-attack graphs, demonstrate how coordinated-attack can be used for vulnerability analysis, and discuss an implementation of a coordinatedattack graph.Coordinated-attack graphs can facilitate a wide range of tasks, such as model checking, opponent modelling, intrusion response, sensor configuration, and so forth. In addition, they can be used in robotic warfare, where several intelligent software agents automatically produce and launch coordinated attacks.
The paper investigates the impact of trust on market efficiency and bilateral contracts. We prove that a market in which agents are trusted to the degree they deserve to be trusted is as efficient as a market with complete trustworthiness. In other words, complete trustworthiness is not a necessary condition for market efficiency. We prove that distrust could significantly reduce market efficiency, and we show how to solve the problem by using appropriately designed multiagent contracts. The problem of trust is studied in the context of a bilateral negotiation game between a buyer and a seller. It is shown that if the seller's trust equals the buyer's trustworthiness, then the social welfare, the amount of trade, and the agents' utility functions are maximized. The paper also studies the efficiency of advance payment contracts as a tool for improving trustworthiness. It is proved that advance payment contracts maximize the social welfare and the amount of trade. Finally, the paper studies the problem of how to make agents truthfully reveal their level of trustworthiness. An incentive-compatible contract is defined, in which agents do not benefit from lying about their trustworthiness. The analysis and the solutions proposed in this paper could help agent designers avoid many market failures and produce efficient interaction mechanisms.
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