Incentive compatible mechanism for trust revelation

Braynov, Sviatoslav; Sandholm, Tüomas

doi:10.1145/544741.544814

Cited by 24 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Truthful declaration of one's trustworthiness eliminates the need of reputation mechanisms and significantly reduces the cost of trust management. The difference from our work is that [5] considers only sellers of one given type and that it requires perfect knowledge about the seller's cost function.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 96%

Reputation-based pricing of P2P services

Jurca

Faltings

2005

Proceeding of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems - P2PECON '05

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In the future peer-to-peer service oriented computing systems, maintaining a cooperative equilibrium is a non-trivial task. In the absence of Trusted Third Parties (TTP's) or verification authorities, rational service providers minimize their costs by providing ever degrading service quality levels. Anticipating this, rational clients are willing to pay only the minimum amounts (often zero) which leads to the collapse of the market.In this paper, we show how a simple reputation mechanism can be used to overcome this moral hazard problem. The mechanism does not act by social exclusion (i.e. exclude providers that cheat) but rather by allowing flexible service level agreements in which quality can be traded for the price. We show that such a mechanism can drive service providers of different types to exert the social efficient effort levels.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 96%

Reputation-based pricing of P2P services

Jurca

Faltings

2005

Proceeding of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems - P2PECON '05

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“…These simplification assumptions have resulted in a fairly straightforward process for collecting ratings from the users, but they may not be particularly realistic for many practical applications. To relax these assumptions, it is possible to incorporate some more advanced techniques into our QA agent, so that issues such as how to collect quality ratings from users or agents whom we can not fully trust may be addressed [18,16,19,14].…”

Section: Fig 1 the System Architecture Of The Qa Agentmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Quality of Service Management Framework Based on User Expectations

Deora

Shao

Gray

et al. 2003

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. The ability to gauge the quality of a service is critical if we are to achieve the service oriented computing paradigm. Many techniques have been proposed and most of them attempt to calculate the quality of a service by collecting quality ratings from the users of the service, then combining them in one way or another. We argue that collecting quality ratings alone from the users is not sufficient for deriving a reliable or accurate quality measure for a service. This is because different users often have different expectations on the quality of a service and their ratings tend to be closely related to their expectations, i.e. how their expectations are met. In this paper, we propose a quality of service management framework based on user expectations. That is, we collect expectations as well as ratings from the users of a service, then calculate the quality of the service only at the time a request for the service is made and only using the ratings that have similar expectations. We give examples to show that our approach can result in a more accurate and meaningful measure for quality of service.

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“…Unfortunately, this may not be enough to inspire the confidence of potential users or adopters of such systems-anything less than complete assurances of trustworthiness raises doubts. Some trust and reputation systems attempt to provide incentives for agents to be honest (e.g., [1]), but one must still ask: Under what circumstances will the incentive hold? Will the incentive always be sufficient?…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards provably secure trust and reputation systems in e-marketplaces

Kerr

Cohen

2007

Proceedings of the 6th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

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In this paper, we present a framework for evaluating the security of trust and reputation systems for electronic marketplaces populated with buying and selling agents. Our proposed framework offers a method for researchers to understand the security of their systems, and to provide precise guarantees of the degree of provable security that these systems offer. We demonstrate the viability of our proposed framework by presenting a specific monetarybased trust system known as Trunits, along with an analysis that shows that Trunits provides a guaranteed level of security for buyers.

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Incentive compatible mechanism for trust revelation

Cited by 24 publications

References 8 publications

Reputation-based pricing of P2P services

Reputation-based pricing of P2P services

A Quality of Service Management Framework Based on User Expectations

Towards provably secure trust and reputation systems in e-marketplaces

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