The present study examined the processes by which children acquire pro-environmental behaviours in different cultures. Our focus was on parental influence. Several studies have been conducted on adults' environmental behaviours; however, we know little about how children's environmental attitudes and behaviours are formed. We conducted a questionnaire survey with elementary school children and one of their parents in Germany and Japan. Two hundred and twenty-one pairs participated in Germany and 365 in Japan. The results of structural equation modelling showed that parents' behaviours affected children's environmental behaviours directly and also via the subjective norm (the children's experienced expectations of their parents). A comparison of the two countries revealed that hypothesized cultural differences between the impact of personal norms and subjective norms were clearer for adults. The results also showed that the effects of subjective norms were stronger for children, indicating that children are more likely to be influenced by expectations of others. The results of the study suggest that for promoting children's environmental behaviours, showing the behaviours in daily life would be most effective. Perceived behavioral control SubjecƟve norm/ family pPN1 G 0.75 J 0.54 G 0.82 J 0.88 pB1 pB2 G 0.78 J 0.90 G 0.95 J 0.78 pPN2 Figure 4 The result of multi-group model between Germany and Japan for parents' behaviour. Note. 1 *p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. 2 Country: G = Germany, J = Japan. 3 Model fit: χ 2 (10) = 30.43, GFI = 0.982, AGFI = 0.924, CFI = 0.984, RMSEA = 0.059. 4 The significantly larger path coefficients are framed by rectangles.

5A field study was conducted to investigate the reduction of plastic bag usage at 6 supermarkets. Many behaviors leading to potential damage to the environment may be 7 unintentional. This study applied a dual motivation model to plastic bag usage and 8 examined the effects of an intervention aimed at promoting pro -environmental 9 behavior. A voice prompt intervention was implemented in Japanese supermarkets. In 10 the first (control) week, shoppers were given free plastic bags by the cashier. In the 11 second (intervention) week, cashiers asked s h o p p e r s w h e t h e r t h e y w a n t e d 12 p l a s t i c b a g s . W e c o l l e c t e d o b s e r v a t i o n a l a n d q u e s t i o n n a i r e m e a s u r e s o f 13 v a r i a b l e s t h a t p r e d i c t e d f r e e p l a s t i c b a g u s a g e d u r i n g t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n . 14 T h e r e s u l t s s u p p o r t e d a d u a l m o t i v a t i o n m o d e l o f b e h a v i o r a l c h a n g e . T h e 15 v o i c e p r o m p t d e c r e a s e d t h e u s a g e o f p l a s t i c b a g s b y b o t h d i s c o u r a g i n g 16u n i n t e n t i o n a l u s a g e a n d e n c o u r a g i n g a n i n t e n t i o n a l r e d u c t i o n i n u s a g e . 17 P o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r i n t e r v e n t i o n s d e s i g n e d b o t h t o a t t e n u a t e u n i n t e n t i o n a l 18 m o t i v a t i o n a n d t o p r o m o t e i n t e n t i o n a l m o t i v a t i o n a r e c o n s i d e r e d . 19 20 K e y w o r d s : b e h a v i o r a l c h a n g e , b e h a v i o r a l i n t e n t i o n , b e h a v i o r a l 21

The present study explored the influences of subjective and descriptive norms on environmentally conscious behaviours between the USA and Japan. It was predicted that subjective norms would have a larger effect on behaviour in Japan than in the USA. Descriptive norms were expected to have a greater influence on behaviour in the USA. The survey was done with 160 American students and 114 Japanese students. The results showed that subjective norms are relevant only in Japan, but the effect was limited. Alternatively, descriptive norms were a powerful determinant in the USA. It was also found that respondents asserted that they commit environmentally conscious behaviours more frequently than others, regardless of their country. The present research suggests that the role of subjective and descriptive norms may vary between cultures, and highlights a necessity for distinguishing between interpersonal and social norms

The evolution of cooperation is an unsolved research topic and has been investigated from the viewpoint of not only biology and other natural sciences but also social sciences. Much extant research has focused on the evolution of cooperation among peers. While, different players belonging to different organizations play different social roles, and players playing different social roles cooperate together to achieve their goals. We focus on the evolution of cooperation in linear division of labor that is defined as follows: a player in the i-th role interacts with a player in the i + 1-th role, and a player in the n-th role achieves their goal (1 ≤ i < n) if there are n roles in the division of labor. We take the industrial waste treatment process as an example for illustration. We consider three organizational roles and B is the i-th role. The player of B can choose two strategies: legal treatment or illegal dumping, which can be interpreted as cooperation or defection (i = 1-3). With legally required treatment, the player of B pays a cost to ask the player of B to treat the waste (j = 1, 2). Then, the cooperator of B pays a cost to treat the waste properly. With illegal dumping, the player of B dumps the waste and does not pay any cost (i = 1-3). However, the waste dumped by the defector has negative environmental consequences, which all players in all roles suffer from. This situation is equivalent to a social dilemma encountered in common-pool resource management contexts. The administrative organ in Japan introduces two sanction systems to address the illegal dumping problem: the actor responsibility system and the producer responsibility system. In the actor responsibility system, if players in any role who choose defection are monitored and discovered, they are penalized via a fine. However, it is difficult to monitor and detect the violators, and this system does not work well. While, in the producer responsibility system, the player in B is fined if the player cannot hand the manifest to the local administrative organ because the players of B (i = 1-3) who choose defection do not hand the manifest to the player of B. We analyze this situation using the replicator equation. We reveal that (1) the three-role model has more empirical credibility than the two-role model including B and B, and (2) the producer responsibility system promotes the evolution of cooperation more than the system without sanctioning. (3) the actor responsibility system does not promote the evolution of cooperation if monitoring and detecting defectors is unsuccessful.

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