The effect of sanctions on the evolution of cooperation in linear division of labor

Abstract

The evolution of cooperation is an unsolved research topic and has been investigated from the viewpoint of not only biology and other natural sciences but also social sciences. Much extant research has focused on the evolution of cooperation among peers. While, different players belonging to different organizations play different social roles, and players playing different social roles cooperate together to achieve their goals. We focus on the evolution of cooperation in linear division of labor that is defined as follows: a player in the i-th role interacts with a player in the i + 1-th role, and a player in the n-th role achieves their goal (1 ≤ i < n) if there are n roles in the division of labor. We take the industrial waste treatment process as an example for illustration. We consider three organizational roles and B is the i-th role. The player of B can choose two strategies: legal treatment or illegal dumping, which can be interpreted as cooperation or defection (i = 1-3). With legally required treatment, the player of B pays a cost to ask the player of B to treat the waste (j = 1, 2). Then, the cooperator of B pays a cost to treat the waste properly. With illegal dumping, the player of B dumps the waste and does not pay any cost (i = 1-3). However, the waste dumped by the defector has negative environmental consequences, which all players in all roles suffer from. This situation is equivalent to a social dilemma encountered in common-pool resource management contexts. The administrative organ in Japan introduces two sanction systems to address the illegal dumping problem: the actor responsibility system and the producer responsibility system. In the actor responsibility system, if players in any role who choose defection are monitored and discovered, they are penalized via a fine. However, it is difficult to monitor and detect the violators, and this system does not work well. While, in the producer responsibility system, the player in B is fined if the player cannot hand the manifest to the local administrative organ because the players of B (i = 1-3) who choose defection do not hand the manifest to the player of B. We analyze this situation using the replicator equation. We reveal that (1) the three-role model has more empirical credibility than the two-role model including B and B, and (2) the producer responsibility system promotes the evolution of cooperation more than the system without sanctioning. (3) the actor responsibility system does not promote the evolution of cooperation if monitoring and detecting defectors is unsuccessful.

The evolution of cooperation in the unidirectional linear division of labour of finite roles

“…In Nakamaru et al (2018) which made the concrete model fitting the industrial dumping system, the cost of cooperation decreases in the downstream roles. Nakamaru et al (2018) concluded that the first role sanction system promotes cooperation more than the defector sanction system especially when the probability of finding a defector is very low, which is also supported by our result when the cost of cooperation decreases in downstream groups. The difference between these two studies is that there are locally stable mixed equilibria such as (1 c , 2 c , 3 c ) = (1, 1, 0) in the baseline and two sanction systems in Nakamaru et al (2018), but in the defector sanction system when the cost of cooperation increases in downstream groups in this study.…”

“…The player in the first role always gets punished for the defection, no matter which role defected. For example, this sanction system is executed to prevent illegal dumping in Japan (Nakamaru et al, 2018).…”

“…However, the division of labour is a rather unexplored field in evolutionary game theory, especially when there are three or more roles in a system. Nakamaru et al(2018) explored the linear division of labour, in which roles are in line linearly, using the evolutionary game theory. They take the industrial dumping system in Japan as an example, in which cooperation and defection mean legal treatment and illegal dumping.…”

The Detrimental Effects of Punishment and Reward on Cooperation in the Industrial Waste Illegal Dumping Game

“…A linear division of labor structure was adopted in accordance with the structure of industrial waste treatment in the Industrial Waste Illegal Dumping Game (Nakamaru, Shimura, Kitakaji, & Ohnuma, 2018). In linear division of labor, it is important to choose players for different roles, and the situation is highly interdependent among the players, depending on the associated negotiations, transactions, and/or reputations.…”

Ecological features benefiting sustainable harvesters in socio‐ecological systems: a case study of Swiftlets in Malaysia

“…These costs may inhibit the effect of monitoring and punishment. Therefore, monitoring and punishment are not always successful in illegal cases of commons, such as poaching, smuggling, illegal logging, and illegal dumping of industrial waste, all of which generally occur in secret and damage the natural environment (Jachmann 2003, Nakamaru et al 2018.…”