The Detrimental Effects of Punishment and Reward on Cooperation in the Industrial Waste Illegal Dumping Game

Abstract

Background. Many studies have shown that sanctions promote cooperation in social dilemma situations. However, it has also been suggested that sanctions have a negative effect. The interactions among people and systems need to be considered to examine the consequences of sanctions. Aim. We examined whether rewards and mutual punishment increased non-cooperation. We regarded illegal industrial waste dumping as a social dilemma in which everyone bears the burden of the cost of illegal dumping, legal treatment is cooperative behavior, and illegal dumping is non-cooperative behavior. Method. We used the Industrial Waste Illegal Dumping Game. This game simulates the structure of industrial waste treatment (incomplete surveillance, various industries with different roles and payoffs, cost of cooperation, etc.) in addition to the social dilemma structure. Players take on roles in industrial waste treatment, negotiating and dealing with other players, and treating industrial waste. We set three conditions. In the reward condition, players can earn rewards by rapidly treating industrial waste. In the mutual punishment condition, players can mutually monitor and punish each other. In the control condition, neither reward nor punishment exists. Results. Non-cooperation occurred more frequently in the reward condition than in the control condition. Conversely, there was no difference in non-cooperation between the mutual punishment and control conditions. Players under the reward condition did not gather information proactively, and information on benefits was not shared. Conclusion. This study showed that sanctions caused non-cooperation. Social dynamics should be considered when evaluating the effectiveness of sanctions. Gaming allows us to examine social consequences, including social dynamics, which leads to discoveries not possible through traditional methods.

A management framework for sudden water pollution: A systematic review output

“…A study by Wu et al (2018) highlighted that limiting unlawful discharge could effectively decrease pollution occurrences as they were the primary source of such incidents. Nonetheless, illegal discharge activities were difficult to detect following the complexity of industrial waste disposal and sporadic distribution of non‐point sources (Kitakaji & Ohnuma, 2019; LUAS, 2017). Consequently, illegal discharge reports were usually less than the actual frequency of occurrence.…”

“…This definition also includes criminal abandonment of waste in unauthorized areas (Lu, 2019). For example, the Japanese Ministry of the Environment has estimated that 40,000 tons of industrial waste have been illegally dumped in Japan annually (Kitakaji & Ohnuma, 2019). Figure 3 demonstrates that illegal dumping connects all three potential pollution sources to water bodies, making it a crucial pathway for SWP.…”

From Then to Now: Transformation in Simulation and Gaming in Japan

“…Articles by Kitakaji and Ohnuma (2019), Ando et al (2019), and Oyamada and Kitani (2019) are other examples of current trends since they address environmental management and use simulations and games as problem-solving tools. The article by Kitakaji and Ohnuma (2019) exposed policy implications when they found that sanctions have no impact on environmental protection in the case of illegal dumping activities.…”

“…Articles by Kitakaji and Ohnuma (2019), Ando et al (2019), and Oyamada and Kitani (2019) are other examples of current trends since they address environmental management and use simulations and games as problem-solving tools. The article by Kitakaji and Ohnuma (2019) exposed policy implications when they found that sanctions have no impact on environmental protection in the case of illegal dumping activities. While Kitakaji and Ohnuma (2019) use the collective strategies approach as discussed by Messik and Brewer (1983), which includes problem-solving by changing structural frameworks, the article by Ando et al (2019) uses the individual strategies approach (also from Messik and Brewer (1983).…”

“…The article by Kitakaji and Ohnuma (2019) exposed policy implications when they found that sanctions have no impact on environmental protection in the case of illegal dumping activities. While Kitakaji and Ohnuma (2019) use the collective strategies approach as discussed by Messik and Brewer (1983), which includes problem-solving by changing structural frameworks, the article by Ando et al (2019) uses the individual strategies approach (also from Messik and Brewer (1983). The individual strategies approach aims at directly changing peoples’ attitudes to environmental issues.…”