This paper analyzes efficient pollution taxation within a stochastic model of endogenous growth. Pollution is a by-product of production and causes disutility. Furthermore, the productivity which results from environmental quality is uncertain. This reflects e.g. uncertain capital depreciation induced by natural disasters like hurricanes or floods. This uncertainty is shown to raise an ambiguous impact on the optimal pollution level as well as on optimal environmental taxation. Market equilibrium turns out to be suboptimal, since the households mis-perceive their individual impact on pollution. Conditions for welfare maximizing pollution taxation are stated and it is shown that a direct pollution tax is not appropriate to yield Pareto-optimal growth. Instead, a linear capital income tax together with a linear abatement subsidy build an efficient tax scheme, if secondarily the governmental budget is balanced. Moreover, an increase in the riskiness of environmental productivity may even lead to an increase in the optimal pollution level and to a decrease in optimal environmental taxation, depending predominantly on the preference parameters. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2007pollution, taxation, uncertainty, endogenous growth, D8, D9, H2, O1, O4, Q2,

The impact of pollution and abatement policy within a stochastic endogenous growth model is analyzed. Environmental care is provided by the government and financed through income taxation and government bonds. Due to environmental preferences and partial perception of the individual's impact on pollution, government debt influences equilibrium growth. Hence, there is an additional growth effect of income taxation due to portfolio adjustment. It is shown that the optimal income tax rate decreases with the perception of the influence of individuals on aggregate capital. In contrast, the impact of environmental preferences and uncertainty on optimal environmental policy is ambiguous.

We analyse the interdependence between green attitude and equilibrium development of environmental quality in an endogenous growth model. Individuals take only part of their impact on pollution into account, hence there is a negative externality of capital accumulation on environmental quality. Increasing wealth or increasing pollution enhance green attitude and reduce the externality, because individuals care more about the environment if their income is higher or if pollution is more obvious. The time path of pollution as well as the evolution of equilibrium growth are shown to depend crucially on the determinants of green attitude. If green attitude improves with increasing wealth, e.g. as a consequence of an increase in environmental education, the economy converges to the sustainable growth path and in the long run, also the optimal level of environmental quality is realized. In contrast, pollution remains at a suboptimally high level if individual attitude towards the environment is influenced by pollution itself, that means, if individuals care the more about environmental issues the worse environmental quality. JEL-Classification: O1, O4, Q2, Q5

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The paper considers stochastic environmental policy and its effects on the environment, portfolio composition, and economic growth. Capital accumulation causes pollution which is reduced by private green services and public abatement. The government subsidizes green services and taxes dirty capital albeit at a rate which may become random, causing unexpected capital write-offs. Tax jumps depend on natural degradation and environmental activism. We derive how uncertainty and political activism affect the risk premia for investors. We analyze the incentives for firms to increase the greenness of production in order to reduce political uncertainty. Stochastic taxation is shown to act as a substitute for green subsidies when uncertainty decreases in the ratio of green services to capital and agents use their green activities strategically. Tax uncertainty may trigger precautionary savings, causing additional growth and enhanced environmental deterioration.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract Standard environmental economics prescribes policies which are optimal and implemented immediately. The paper argues that, in reality, environmental policy often deviates from the optimum and implementation is not deterministic but subject to major uncertainty and frequent change. We present a model with a stochastic policy process that affects investors' decisions and the composition of capital. We assume that pollution is reduced by private green services and public abatement. The government subsidizes green services and taxes dirty capital albeit at a rate which may become random, causing unexpected capital write-offs. Tax jumps depend on environmental degradation and the share of green services. We show how policy uncertainty affects capital valuation and how it alters individual portfolios, green services, and economic growth. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL Classification: Q52, Q54, O10

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