Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.IZA Discussion Paper No. 5040 June 2010 ABSTRACT Getting More Work for Nothing? Symbolic Awards and Worker PerformanceWe study the impact of status and social recognition on worker performance in a field experiment. In collaboration with an international non-governmental organization we hired students to work on a database project. Students in the award treatment were offered a congratulatory card from the organization honoring the best performance. The award was purely symbolic in order to ensure that any behavioral effect is driven by non-material benefits. Our results show that students in the award treatment outperform students in the control treatment by about 12 percent on average. Our results provide strong evidence for the motivating power of status and social recognition in labor relations with major implications for theory and applications. JEL Classification:C93, M52
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. Non-Technical SummaryBehavioral economics has provided striking insights that are contrary to the standard economic framework. Years of experiments, in laboratories as well as in the field, have shown the diversity of human actions and the failure to predict these actions with standard (neo-)classical assumptions of plain utility maximization. Numerous researchers have contributed impressive results, particularly to the field of incentives and motivation. The evidence suggests that individuals give more importance to the present than to the future and suffer more from losses than they enjoy gains of equal magnitude. They tend to behave with an aversion to inequality and can be motivated with non-monetary rewards.However, so far, one important field has been left aside, namely studies with clear impact on the educational system and the students involved in it. This is unfortunate to the effect that unambiguously positive results on student performance and by association education can have vast impacts not only on student life but also on the whole economy.To fill this gap, we conducted several field experiments to test behavioral principles on approximately 6,500 elementary and high school students in Chicago. Immediately before a standardized, computer-based test, of which the students need to take three a year, the students received information about one specific of several incentive schemes. Students could receive a reward if they improved their performance on the test in comparison to their previous test score. The incentives were either monetary or non-monetary and rewarding followed either immediately after the test or with a delay of one month. Additionally, some incentives were framed as losses, meaning that students received the reward beforehand and were informed the reward would be taken away, if they did not improve their performance.The results of our set of experiments are in line with previous research, showing that incentives matter. In particular, we show that financial incentives, if large enough, have positive effects on performance, confirming conventional wisdom. Furthermore, we demonstrate effects of rather unusual incentive schemes. The possibility of losing a just received $10-bill or trophy is more powerful than the chance of being rewarded after the test.We also find a considerably larger effect of non-monetary rewards -trophies in our casethan of monetary payments of either $10 or $20 for younger students. This, however, is not true for...
This paper reports the results from a controlled field experiment designed to investigate the causal effect of unannounced, public recognition on employee performance. We hired more than 300 employees to work on a three-hour data-entry task. In a random sample of work groups, workers unexpectedly received recognition after two hours of work. We find that recognition increases subsequent performance substantially, and particularly so when recognition is exclusively provided to the best performers. Remarkably, workers who did not receive recognition are mainly responsible for this performance increase. Our results are consistent with workers having a preference for conformity and being reciprocal at the same time.JEL Classifications: C93, M52. Keywords: employee motivation, recognition, reciprocity, conformity, field experiment. * We gratefully acknowledge comments and suggestions by a Department Editor, an Associate Editor, three anonymous referees, Iwan Barankay, Gary Charness, Tore Ellingsen, Dirk Engelmann, Guido Friebel, David Gill, Michael Kosfeld, Steve Levitt, John List, Michel Maréchal, Dina Pommeranz, Ingrid Rohde, Marie Claire Villeval, and numerous seminar and conference participants. We thank Ann-Kathrin Koessler for excellent research assistance. The experiment has been conducted within the ethical guidelines of our home institutions.
Awards in the form of orders, decorations, prizes, and titles are ubiquitous in monarchies and republics, private organizations, not-for-profit, and profit-oriented firms. This paper argues that awards present a unique combination of different stimuli and that they are distinct and unlike other monetary and non-monetary rewards. Despite their relevance in all areas of life awards have not received much scientific attention. We propose to study awards and present results on a vignette experiment that quantifies and isolates the effects of different award characteristics such as the publicity associated with winning an award. Further, employing a unique data set, we demonstrate that there are substantial differences in the intensity of usage of awards across countries. Introduction Awards all overIf an alien were to look at the social life of people here on earth, it would be stunned by the enormous number of awards in the form of orders, medals, decorations, prizes, titles and other honors. It would be hard pressed to find any area of society in which awards are not used. Awards are equally ubiquitous in monarchies as in staunch republics. In the French Republic, for instance, the légion d'honneur plays an important role, and 3'000 such awards are conferred annually (House of Commons 2004). In the United States, the President and Congress bestow medals, while at the same time purple hearts, bronze and silver stars are handed out quite liberally, and at an increasing rate in the military service (Cowen 2000: 93). It is well known that a flood of orders, medals and titles (such as "Hero of the Soviet Union" or "Hero of Socialist Labour") was handed out in communist countries, such as the Soviet Union or the German Democratic Republic, and that this behavior it is typical for both rightand left-wing dictatorships.Awards exist not only at the national level. In the arts, culture and the media, awards are also of central importance. A few prominent examples are the Academy Awards (Oscars), the prizes handed out by the film festivals at Cannes, Venice or Berlin, the (1'200 persons), and "Young Global Leaders" (1'111 persons below 40 years of age).It would be a mistake to attribute this trend simply to "Americanism". In Britain, for instance, the leaders of many large corporations are decorated with orders and titles. 6Or take the Dalai Lama who has received a myriad of awards and honors among them the Nobel Peace Prize, two honorary doctorates, the honorary citizenship of the Ukraine, and the United States Congressional Gold Medal. LiteratureThe science of phaleristics (the Greek and Roman word for award) has produced a large literature on specific awards, in particular on orders, decorations and medals. Despite the importance of awards in society, economists have largely disregarded them. 8 However, there is some literature in economics that provides insights into isolated aspects of awards. A typical way for (standard) economists to look at awards would be in terms of the signal emitted (see Spence 197...
We manipulate workers' perceived meaning of a job in a field experiment and interact meaning of work with both financial and recognition incentives. Results show that workers exert more effort when meaning is high. Money has a positive effect on performance that is independent of meaning. In contrast, meaning and recognition interact negatively. Our results provide new insights into the stability of incentive effects across important work contexts. They also suggest that meaning and worker recognition may operate via the same motivational channel. (JEL C93, J33, M12, M52)
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. Non-Technical SummaryBehavioral economics has provided striking insights that are contrary to the standard economic framework. Years of experiments, in laboratories as well as in the field, have shown the diversity of human actions and the failure to predict these actions with standard (neo-)classical assumptions of plain utility maximization. Numerous researchers have contributed impressive results, particularly to the field of incentives and motivation. The evidence suggests that individuals give more importance to the present than to the future and suffer more from losses than they enjoy gains of equal magnitude. They tend to behave with an aversion to inequality and can be motivated with non-monetary rewards.However, so far, one important field has been left aside, namely studies with clear impact on the educational system and the students involved in it. This is unfortunate to the effect that unambiguously positive results on student performance and by association education can have vast impacts not only on student life but also on the whole economy.To fill this gap, we conducted several field experiments to test behavioral principles on approximately 6,500 elementary and high school students in Chicago. Immediately before a standardized, computer-based test, of which the students need to take three a year, the students received information about one specific of several incentive schemes. Students could receive a reward if they improved their performance on the test in comparison to their previous test score. The incentives were either monetary or non-monetary and rewarding followed either immediately after the test or with a delay of one month. Additionally, some incentives were framed as losses, meaning that students received the reward beforehand and were informed the reward would be taken away, if they did not improve their performance.The results of our set of experiments are in line with previous research, showing that incentives matter. In particular, we show that financial incentives, if large enough, have positive effects on performance, confirming conventional wisdom. Furthermore, we demonstrate effects of rather unusual incentive schemes. The possibility of losing a just received $10-bill or trophy is more powerful than the chance of being rewarded after the test.We also find a considerably larger effect of non-monetary rewards -trophies in our casethan of monetary payments of either $10 or $20 for younger students. This, however, is not true for...
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. Non-technical SummaryRecognition is an important source of employee motivation. But how should managers allocate recognition: should they praise all? Or should they recognize only extraordinary performances? This issue has not yet been addressed sufficiently. On the one hand, exclusive recognition might raise the performance of high-performers even further as they feel acknowledged and motivated by the public praise. However, this might come at the cost of discouraging and frustrating the non-recipients. On the other hand, non-recipients might respond positively as they are encouraged to catch up with the high-performers while the latter might rest on their laurels. We tackle this research question by conducting a field experiment which investigates the causal effect of recognition on work performance. We hired more than 300 workers for a three-hour data-entry job. After two hours of work, we randomized the provision of unannounced recognition by handing out a thank-you card, which was personally signed by the head of the research institute. By varying the number of recipients of the thank-you card we were able to study the effect of exclusive recognition. Depending on the treatment, we assigned a thank-you card either to the best one, the best three, or all workers of a work group. We find that recognition significantly increases subsequent performance, and in particular so if recognition is exclusively provided to the best performers. Recognition to the best three performers in a group yields the largest effect on workers' productivity in comparison with either recognition to all employees or recognition to the best performer. Interestingly, performance increases in response to exclusive recognition are mainly driven by strong positive effects of non-recipients. Conformity preferences are the most likely reason for these responses. Upon learning that one does not belong to the best three performers in a group of eight, non-recipients feel inclined to improve performance so as to adhere to the apparent group norm. In line with this interpretation, we find weaker (but still positive) responses of non-recipients when only the best performer in a group receives recognition as this provides a weaker signal of low relative performance than belonging to the bottom five out of eight workers. However, conformity preferences cannot explain all of our results. In particular, recipients of recognition do not decrease performance, as conformity would suggest, but rather (a...
We study a field experiment at a large technology company. Employees were encouraged to submit ideas on process and product improvements. The company randomly assigned 19 teams into treatment and control groups. Treatment team employees received rewards if their ideas were approved. Nothing changed for control team employees. Our main finding is that rewards substantially increased the quality of ideas. Rewards increased participation in the suggestion system but decreased ideas per participating employee, with zero net effect on the quantity of ideas. Broader participation persisted after the reward was discontinued, suggesting habituation. We find no evidence for motivational crowding out.
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