Much of the negotiation literature involves two parties that are each assumed to behave in a unitary manner, although a growing body of knowledge considers more complex negotiations. Examples of the latter include two parties where one or both parties do not behave in a unitary manner, multiple parties on one or both sides, parties on multiple sides and parties engaged in separate but linked negotiations. Greater degrees of complexity distinguish these negotiations from negotiations with two unitary parties.
This article analyzes the coalition‐building tactics employed by the Bush administration during the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990–91. To provide a basis for generalization to other situations, we have developed a conceptual framework for understanding sources of power in coalition building. This framework draws upon research in the social psychology of persuasion, mass communications and negotiation analysis. While the actions of the Bush administration during the Persian Gulf crisis provide a “text‐book” case for applying our conceptual framework, we believe that it could be employed much more broadly to analyze the efforts of leaders to effect political and organizational change.
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