When does domestic unrest lead to interstate conflict? I present the diversionary target theory that argues that domestically troubled states are more likely to use military force against some, but not all, states because political leaders prefer targets that can evoke their domestic audience's fear or greed in order to enjoy “rally‐round‐the‐flag” effects. I suggest that the fear‐producing targets are foreign states that exhibit rapidly rising power or manifest different identities. The greed‐producing targets are foreign states occupying disputed territory or exercising regional/local hegemony despite declining power. In addition, I expect that political leaders prefer fear‐ or greed‐producing targets that possess similar powers, because domestic audiences may see initiation of military conflicts against too‐powerful states or too‐weak states as excessively risky and unnecessary, respectively. From statistical analyses on directed dyad‐years from 1920 to 2001, I find that the presence of a rising power, a territory target, or a hegemony target contributes to the correlation between domestic unrest and the initiation of interstate conflict in a statistically significant way.
Faced with the possibility of losing their position due to domestic opposition, political leaders may sometimes consider initiating a foreign conflict as a means to redirect attention away from domestic issues. In such instances, which states are most likely to become diversionary targets? This study assumes that unpopular leaders prefer small-scale conflicts that can create rally-round-the-flag effects without triggering substantial domestic opposition to the use of military force abroad. Based on this assumption, hypotheses are developed which predict that states under constraint (i.e. states with democratic institutions or showing high trade openness) tend to attract diversionary-motivated actions, while states likely to reciprocate harshly (i.e. states experiencing their own domestic troubles or in relative decline) are less likely to become diversionary targets. Logit analyses of directed dyad-years from 1960 to 2001 and illustrations of marginal effects provide strong support for three of the four hypotheses -namely, that democracies and trading states are more likely, and that declining powers are less likely to be targets of diversionary actions. This study's findings show that not all potential targets are equally attractive for diversionary actions, and that a state's democratization, economic openness, and power growth can worsen, rather than improve, its security.
What causes war? Among others, domestic unrest has been regarded as one of the factors contributing to interstate war. Many scholars, pundits, and policymakers have emphasized internal troubles to account for the occurrence of international wars, including the Falklands War, World Wars I and II, the Russo-Japanese War, and the Imjin War (Japan’s invasion of Korea in the late 16th century). Especially since the end of the Cold War, following the theoretical and methodological suggestions in Levy 1989 (cited under General Overviews), international relations scholars have paid increasingly more attention to domestic unrest and its interaction with other factors such as regime type and strategic rivalry to explain interstate and intrastate conflict. By taking different methodologies, such as quantitative statistical analysis, in-depth case study, and formal modeling, they build causal processes linking domestic unrest to international conflict, identify various factors at the levels of the individual, state, and dyad affecting the onset of a diversionary conflict, and provide empirical evidence supporting or disproving their theories.
Is China's rise a threat? Offensive realists see rising China as a main cause of global instability in the 21st century. Because all states seek security through power maximization, China will clash with the United States for regional hegemony in Asia. But critics of the offensive realist view emphasize common interests, global institutions, and domestic constraints, particularly since China's rapid growth makes the country more open to and dependent on the global economy. This study compares these competing approaches to China's growth and regional stability and develops hypotheses based on four factors that could influence China's interaction with other nations: China's own level of economic power, its growth rate, whether a potential antagonist is allied with the United States, and whether the two countries have a territorial dispute. Then it conducts a logit analysis of China's military aggression against Asian states and major powers in the post‐Mao period. The results show that China's growing power has encouraged its initiation of military conflicts, and that Beijing has become aggressive against its opponents in territorial disputes, but not more so against America's Asian allies than against other countries. The findings suggest that China's continued rise will likely contribute to its firm position in the South and East China Seas and its resolute protection of core strategic and economic interests.
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